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Religious certitude is often associated with conflict between individuals and 
groups, though the nature of this relationship is still not clear.  To further clarify these 
dynamics, the historical psychology of religion is reviewed and contrasted with current 
perspectives from social psychology and neuroscience, with an eye towards better 
understanding the variance within religious expressions and their associated relationships 
with intergroup conflict.  It is hypothesized that religious certainty is related to a 
difficulty in engaging with contradictory religious perspectives, and that the pull towards 
certainty is tied to an individual’s unique psychological structure, much of which is 
developed through the interaction of formative variables over the lifespan.   
Utilizing data (N=2331) collected during the Forum BEVI Project, a multi-
institution, multi-year project coordinated by the Forum on Education Abroad and the 
International Beliefs and Values Institute, statistical analyses consisting of ANOVAs, 
regression analyses, and structural equation modeling are used to explore these ideas.  
Results suggest that a propensity to identify with religious certitude is predictive of one’s 
beliefs in a number of other areas.  Further, individuals who report distressing early life 
events associated with unmet developmental needs may tend towards belief certainty.  
However, structural equation modeling highlights the complexity of this relationship, 
suggesting the importance of accounting for individual differences.  Finally, analyses 
indicate that the variance in levels of certainty within religious groups is greater than the 
variance between these groups.  It is therefore concluded that accounting for levels of 
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religious certainty is more helpful than emphasizing particular religious traditions when 
seeking to understand intergroup conflict.  
These findings suggest the value of fostering an agnostic theory of knowledge, 
and a continuum of belief is proposed to illustrate this concept in relation to religious 
belief.  Towards this end, interventions meant to facilitate intergroup dialogue and 





It infuriates me to be wrong when I know I’m right. 
         Molière 
 
In this time of globalization and collision of worldviews, the need for a deeper 
understanding of religious faith is more pressing than ever.  Ideologies and religious 
systems which seem to contradict one‟s own beliefs often are perceived as a personal or 
cultural attack, which may lead to physical or relational violence against the perceived 
source of this attack (Silberman, Higgins, & Dweck, 2005; Tan, 2009).  One does not 
have to look far to see examples of conflicts where the battle lines are drawn between 
those of different religious affiliations.  A small sampling of recent examples includes the 
clashes between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Jews and Muslims in the 
Middle East, Christians and Muslims in Bosnia and Sudan, Hindus and Muslims in India, 
and Muslim extremists‟ violence towards secularized America and the “Christian West” 
(Hunsberger, 2005; Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995).  While it may be argued that these 
conflicts also are about politics, ethnicity, or economics in addition to religious faith, the 
question of why differences in religious faith often create the borders between friend and 
enemy still remains largely unanswered (Yiftachel, 2006).  In other words, it seems that 
differences in religious belief often are linked to conflict between individuals and groups, 
but the why of this association still appears unclear.
1 
In grappling with this fundamental question of “why,” we examine a wide range 
of issues in this dissertation including the psychology of religion, the nature of belief 
certitude, as well as the theoretical associations and empirical correlates that are related to 
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these constructs.  We then present findings from a large scale assessment project, which 
examines the etiology of beliefs and values.  Based upon the accompanying theoretical 
model (Equilintegration or EI Theory) and assessment method (the Beliefs, Events, and 
Values Inventory or BEVI), we offer a series of data-based conclusions and 
recommendations that address the study of religious certitude specifically as well as the 
nature of belief certitude more broadly.  Chief among these is support of agnosticism, 
along a larger Continuum of Belief, as an intellectually defensible and interpersonally 
advantageous framework on matters over which definitive conclusions – those that are 
empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – seem untenable.  Finally, we 
translate this perspective into applied form by describing educational and psychological 
interventions that encourage critical reflective thinking about religious or non-religious 
systems of thought, with a specific focus on cross-conviction dialogues.  Through this 
comprehensive approach – which juxtaposes relevant literature with theory, data, and 
application – it is our hope that this dissertation may help advance the overarching goal 
of facilitating greater understanding of why we believe what we believe regarding 
transcendental matters while offering possibilities for deeper and more constructive 
engagement with self and others on these fundamental matters that affect us all.  
 
The Nature of Certitude  
Certitude has been conceptualized in a number of ways (e.g., Arkin, Oleson, & 
Carroll, 2009), but for present purposes, is defined as the absence of doubt.  This absence 
of doubt, which may result from a complex interaction among affective, attributional, 




contemplate the potential legitimacy of another‟s perspective much less the potential 
shortcomings of one‟s own.  The tendency toward certitude requires fidelity to an allied – 
and often unknown or unacknowledged – epistemological framework with its own set of 
assumptions.  Thus, without digressing too far into philosophical arguments regarding 
certainty, it may be helpful to highlight the dilemma that is inherent in claiming 
inviolability regarding one‟s own beliefs (Shealy, 2005).   
The problem of induction, for instance, challenges the assumption that we can 
deduce from our past experiences what will be certain in the future.  For example, if a hot 
stove burned my hand in the past, I might be certain it will do so again in the future.  
However, this inductive logic assumes that the laws of nature are constant and uniform, 
while simultaneously ignoring the fact that additional variables must be accounted for as 
well (e.g., the fact that a stove burner may or may not be turned on).  As an antidote to 
such linearity, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, and psychologists such as Rollo 
May, have emphasized the subjective, phenomenological, and existential nature of human 
experience (Towler, 1984).  From the standpoint of allied scholarship and practice in 
psychology, an individual may not necessarily “know” the complete and correct 
interpretation of reality, as if omnipotent, but should instead grant that multiple 
perspectives may be valid even if the apprehender regards them as improbable or even 
impossible (May, 1983; Spinelli, 2005).   
On the other hand, even if someone may not be able to know something for 
certain, it does not necessarily follow that one concurrently may not have a high level of 
confidence that a particular proposition about the nature of reality is true (Van den Bos, 




experience legitimate certainty based on the assumption of supernaturally revealed (“a 
priori”) truth.  However, this sort of inductive logic appears sufficient only among those 
who concur on a particular religious source for their beliefs (Frame, 1987, Shealy, 2005).  
Though many are unaware of these epistemological nuances, we argue that reflection 
upon them encourages an informed yet humble approach towards competing 
perspectives.  This line of reasoning has been popularized recently by works tailored to 
the broader reading public, such as Being Wrong, which essentially maintains that one‟s 
capacity to embrace the possibility of being mistaken is perhaps better viewed of as a 
sign of cognitive competence than human fallibility (Harford, 2011; Schultz, 2010). 
Moreover, it is not just the religious who are subject to such processes, since the 
expression of certitude, which so often underlies religious belief, may be observed also in 
the attitudes and assertions of the avowedly “non-religious.”  For instance, Richard 
Dawkins, a prominent atheist, has declared that the end of religious faith could solve 
many of the world‟s most pressing conflicts (2006).  In contrast, others have pointed out 
the “religiousness” of such absolutist claims and their concurrent hostility towards the 
religious “other” (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Haidt, 2007; Himmelfarb, 2012).  Due to 
the apparent prevalence of these types of claims from a variety of ideological 
perspectives, some have concluded that the multiplicity of views present in our 
globalized world have created a “postmodern paradox,” which has made the certainty 
provided by absolutist worldviews especially attractive (Dunn, 1998; Hogg, 2011; Hogg, 
Adelman, & Blagg, 2010).  Regardless, whether the content of one‟s worldview is 




sense of certitude that prompts rejection of or even attacks toward those who hold a 
conflicting perspective (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).   
This situation is rendered even more complex when we consider that many people 
who hold such views often feel justified by a sincerely held belief that they are creating a 
better world (Silberman et al., 2005).  The philosopher and political theorist Isaiah Berlin 
appears to have had this dynamic in mind when he observed: 
If one really believes that [an “Ultimate Solution”] is possible, then surely no cost 
would be too high a price to pay for that?  To make such an omelet, there is surely 
no limit to the number of eggs that should be broken…If your desire to save 
mankind is serious, you must harden your heart, and not reckon the cost (as cited 
in Murphy, 2012, p. SR12). 
Essentially, then, claims which are certain regarding transcendental matters exist 
both within and beyond the bounds of organized religion.  Why would this be?  On the 
one hand, expressers of certitude – in a religious and non-religious realm – may 
experience a high psychological need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010).  From this 
perspective, closure requires an a priori disregard for the multiplicity of other competing 
claims, with a lack of sensitivity to the inherently ambiguous nature of truth claims in 
general, due to the security experienced by envelopment within one‟s perceived base of 
factual knowledge.  Evidence for this phenomenon is provided by studies which have 
found that an expression of certitude often is intimately connected with overt assuredness 
regarding the nature and impact of “truth” in the world (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hogg, 
2005; Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007).  For instance, research 




amount of negative affect (e.g., anger) towards statements which strongly contradict 
one‟s own perspectives, including those of a religious nature (i.e., the higher the degree of 
certainty, the higher the degree of negative affect) (Van den Bos, Van Ameijde, & Van 
Gorp, 2006; Van den Bos et al., 2012). 
Such findings beg the following questions:  Is it possible to coexist peacefully 
with others who hold beliefs which contradict – sometimes vociferously – one‟s 
own?  How can someone hold religious or non-religious beliefs without becoming 
prejudiced towards those who don‟t grant legitimacy to one‟s own version of reality 
(Shealy, 2005)?  Such questions are core to the psychological study of religion, as 
psychologists ultimately are concerned with increasing “people‟s understanding of 
themselves and others...to...improve the condition of individuals, organizations, and 
society” (American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 2).  From an ethical standpoint, 
the following rationale for such an emphasis by psychology and psychologists – as well 
as allied scholars and practitioners should be clear: When people are unable to peacefully 
coexist with those who hold different or contradictory beliefs, they are motivated to 
attack the “freedom of inquiry and expression,” instead of seeking to increase their 
understanding of the “other,” which psychologists are expected to promote and preserve 
(p. 2; Silberman et al., 2005; Tan, 2009; Van den Bos et al., 2006).  As Cilliers (2002) 
maintains, “It is only when [people] have a deep understanding of their own religious 
traditions and are willing to learn and recognize the richness of other religious traditions 
that constructive cooperation can take place between groups from different faiths” (p. 
58).   In this dissertation, then, we contend that one‟s ability to tolerate uncertainty – and 




associated with a particular psychological structure, which has been formed over one‟s 
lifespan via an interaction of multiple formative variables (e.g., demographics, 
experiences, culture).  Moreover, this self structure is expressed through both conscious 
beliefs and values as well as through the activation of unconscious emotional schemas, 
which directly affect the holding and expression of one‟s religious beliefs – or non-
religious beliefs – in relation to others (Shealy, in press). 
 
Psychological Perspectives on Religious Certitude 
Building upon this introduction to the construct of certitude, it may be helpful to 
consider how the psychological study of religion has informed our understanding of the 
nature of religious belief.  In much of the scholarly literature, the term religion refers to 
“narrow, dogmatic beliefs and obligatory observances” (Wulff, 1996, p. 47).  In this 
sense, religion may be distinguished from more intrinsic forms of religious belief 
(Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Jonas, & Frey, 2006) as well as spirituality, which 
often refers to the “mysterious realm of transcendent experience” (Wulff, p. 47).  For 
present purposes, unless otherwise noted, the term religion is used in its broadest sense, 
which encompasses both religion and spirituality.  However, in order to have an accurate 
view of psychology‟s historical relationship with religion, while facilitating a more 
nuanced examination of religious certainty, it may be helpful to overview the major 
perspectives on religion which have dominated this field of inquiry over the years.   
The earliest psychological conceptualizations of religion tended to be critical in 
nature, often seeing it as a defense against reality (Paragment & Park, 1995).  For 




product of infantile longings for a powerful and protective father figure, as well as an 
amalgamation of rituals which were consistent with the obsessive symptoms of 
neurosis.  Although Freud saw religion as being pragmatically useful in its ability to tame 
destructive human instincts, he also felt it tended to promote psychological servitude 
(Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995).  Thus, Freud proposed that if people could abandon 
religion and courageously face the unknowns of their own existence, human civilization 
would be the better for it.  Juxtaposing this perspective with our current focus, one might 
conclude that Freud believed that religious people needed courageously to accept non-
certitude (Wulff, 1996). 
In contrast to Freud‟s dynamic approach, the early behaviorists linked religious 
belief to environmentally-mediated phenomena, such as “superstitious” behavior, which 
sought to impose order and predictability upon events and phenomena which seemed 
outside of an organism‟s control.  In other words, they attempted to demonstrate that 
religious ideation could parsimoniously be explained by naturalistic and behavioral laws.  
For example, B.F. Skinner conceptualized religion as a product of reinforcement by an 
individual‟s religious priests, creeds, and codes.  In a well-known experiment to illustrate 
such processes, he conditioned pigeons to exhibit superstitious behavior in order to elicit 
pellets of food (Skinner, 1948).  Another behaviorist, George Vetter, compared human 
religious belief to “superstitious behavior” in animals (such as pigeons and rats), which 
arises as a response to unpredictable or uncontrollable situations (Vetter, 1958).  Along 
complementary lines, James Leuba demonstrated experimentally that he could produce a 
mystical experience in subjects through the use of psychedelic drugs.  On the basis of this 




through physiological processes.  It is interesting to note, however, that Leuba also saw 
this “spiritual urge” as an essential characteristic of human nature.  Resisting the 
exclusivity of traditional religious expressions, he worked to found religious societies 
which used ceremony, prayer, and confession apart from the worship of a particular god 
(Leuba, 1925; Leuba, 1950).  
 Although some behaviorists might have granted that religion could have social 
benefits, it was seen as far better for “believers” to lead principled and meaningful lives 
without needing the proverbial crutch of supernatural beliefs (Skinner, 1987).  George 
Vetter (1958) asserted this viewpoint in his work, Religion and Magic: Their 
Psychological Nature, Origin, and Function: 
The priesthoods of whatever stripe can never live down, nor make amends for, 
their disgraceful role in retarding the development of modem science during the 
past millennium in Christendom.... Supernaturalism is, in its social functions and 
consequences, a dangerous opiate.  And, what is perhaps even worse, it 
discourages objective attempts at intelligent social trial-and-error, planning, and 
even research, and undermines man's faith in his own resources. (p. 515) 
 Although many were quite critical of religion, other early and non-behavioral 
psychologists apprehended religion in a more favorable light.  For example, in his 
seminal Varieties of Religious Experience, William James (1902) agreed that for some 
people, religion could be dangerous and a sign of naiveté.  However, through his 
observations of a wide variety of religious persons, he concluded that when religious 




religion), levels of “human excellence” could be achieved which could not be reached in 
any alternative way.   
From an alternative but no less sympathetic standpoint, Carl Jung saw religious 
experience as being rooted in “archetypes,” which are part of a universal human psyche 
that he referred to as the “collective unconscious.” Such experiences, and their expression 
through participation in religious traditions, were central to an individual‟s process of 
individuation and self-realization.  According to Jung, modern humans were vulnerable 
to experiencing conflicts regarding the complexities and seeming contradictions of 
religious belief, which might lead to a loss of a transcending perspective on life.  This 
conclusion was due largely to his experiences as a clinician, where he observed:  
It is safe to say that every one of [my patients over the age of thirty-five] fell ill 
because he had lost what the living religions of every age have given to their 
followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his 
religious outlook (Jung, 1933, p. 229). 
As such, Jung proposed that religious experiences should be explored and facilitated in 
order to promote higher levels of human consciousness, which could allow the successful 
navigation of the individuation process apart from the boundaries of traditional religion.  
In this way, Jung sought to introduce an inclusive religious system, which would 
transcend the divisive certitude of traditional religious perspectives.  Jung‟s theory largely 
has been ignored by the field of psychology due to its esoteric leanings as well as 
attendant difficulty with the empirical investigation of its central constructs.  However, 




psychologists, of spiritual/religious experience in human development and functioning 
(Wulff, 1996). 
Like Freud, Erik Erikson (1950, 1962) saw correlations between one‟s religious 
convictions and early developmental experiences and needs.  However, instead of 
perceiving this linkage as evidence for the problematic substitution of religion for unmet 
infantile needs, he saw religion as potentially aligning with the most basic yearnings of 
the self.  More specifically, the religious inclination was a manifestation of deep human 
needs to experience a sense of “trust” that life ultimately is benevolent.  Erikson also 
believed that religion could facilitate wisdom, which was a focus of his final stage of 
human development – ego integrity versus despair – and relevant to one‟s ability to 
accept the inevitability of his or her own death.  Like other theorists, Erickson warned 
that religious belief could be associated with abuse and exploitation; however, he 
perceived religious experience to be an integral component of mature human 
development, arguing that healthy adults recognized and nurtured their spiritual 
inclinations (Kiesling, 2008; Wulff, 1996).   
From the perspective of humanistic psychology, Erich Fromm conceptualized the 
impulse toward religion as an attempt to resolve the existential anxiety which derives 
from humanity‟s experienced separation from other creatures due to our unique capacity 
for self-awareness.  Moreover, he defined “religion” as any system of thought or action 
that was shared by a group, provided an object of devotion, and fostered an orientation 
toward meaning-making.  He also separated religions into two broad types: humanistic 
(god as an example of the ideal person; focused on self-realization; loving; joyful) and 




limited in their power; guilt is a primary experiential state) (Awad & Clark, 2009; 
Fromm, 1950).  Fromm‟s ideas have received some empirical support, including a study 
which found that religious commitment was associated with increased levels of personal 
growth when the death of a close friend was attributed to a loving god (Park & Cohen, 
1993).  In some ways, Fromm‟s division of religion into authoritarian and humanistic 
types parallels the difference between religious convictions characterized by a sense of 
certitude versus those that are held in the context of a personally empowering quest for 
spiritual meaning-making.  
Another important conceptualization of religion from a humanistic standpoint was 
that of Abraham Maslow (1964), who distinguished between religious people who had 
experienced a “peak experience” and those who either had not or had become defended 
against such a state.  For Maslow, a “peak experience” was a period of intense feelings of 
wholeness and fusion with the world in which one feels fully alive and becomes aware of 
absolute values such as truth, justice, and beauty.  According to Maslow, religious people 
who had not experienced a “peak experience” were looking to a religious system which 
was meant to preserve the “peak experience” of someone in the past, with the lamentable 
consequence of preventing present-day followers from actually encountering such an 
experience for themselves.  More specifically,  
What happens to many people…is that they simply concretize all of the symbols, 
all of the words, all of the statues, all of the ceremonies, and by a process of 
functional autonomy make them, rather than the original revelation, into the 
sacred…In [this] idolatry the essential meaning gets so lost in concretizations that 




to prophets in general, that is, to the very people that we might call from our 
present point of view the truly religious people. (Maslow, 1964, pp. 24-25) 
One substantive critique of Maslow was that his views were based in part on the traits of 
figures that he saw as historical exemplars of self-actualization (such as Martin Luther 
King and Jesus) without empirical data to support his hypotheses (Wulff, 1996).  
Nonetheless, Maslow‟s basic propositions have received considerable interest by 
psychologists and non-psychologists.  For present purposes, it may be hypothesized that 
someone who experiences a high degree of certainty in their religious convictions would 
have less capacity or inclination for the transcendent “peak experiences” that Maslow 
described.  
From another vantage point, aligned with the theoretical postulates and applied 
interventions of the psychodynamic school, attachment and object relations theorists 
often maintain that the ways we interact with our experience of god are associated 
intimately with our historical experiences as well as the ways in which we interact with 
others.  In other words, if one‟s approach to the divine is shaped by an attitude 
characterized by certitude, then this same attitude may well characterize their encounters 
with the “other” (e.g., resulting in less capacity or inclination towards understanding and 
the ability to experience and express a full range of emotions within interpersonal 
relationships).  One exemplar of this perspective was Donald Winnicott (1953, 1971) who 
saw religion not as a universal neurosis ala Freud, but rather as a relationship with the 
divine that is tied to an individual‟s internalized structure for relationships.  Therefore, 
one‟s relationship with god could either be beneficial or detrimental depending on the 




expressed.  This hypothesis is still being explored, with at least one study concluding that 
there is a strong correlation between the quality and maturity of a person‟s relationship 
with god and the maturity of their relations with others (Hall, 2007).   
Attachment theorists also have hypothesized that religious commitments to god 
may be a form of attachment relationship.  Examples of such putative phenomena include 
seeking closeness to god in prayer and rituals, using god as a safe haven during times of 
distress, and using god as a secure base for exploring the environment.  Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that individuals with secure attachments form relationships with a 
loving and caring god, while individuals with insecure attachments are more likely to 
perceive god as distant – or to avoid forming a relationship with god at all.  Evidence for 
such processes has been found in cultures where parenting style correlates with the 
overriding cultural conceptualization of god (Rohner, 1986).  Along similar lines, 
Granqvist (2007) found that experiences with insensitive parents (e.g., rejecting and/or 
role-reversing) were associated with sudden religious changes during life situations of 
emotional turmoil.  Likewise, Davis (2009) found a correlation between attachment 
anxiety and avoidance vis-à-vis one‟s experience and perception of god.   
Along similar lines, other scholars have found evidence that some may use their 
relationship with god as a compensation for previous insecure attachments.  For instance, 
Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1990) found that people who grew up in relatively nonreligious 
families, and reported avoidant attachments with their caregiver, were more likely to be 
religious as adults (when compared to other attachment styles).  Also, regardless of the 
religiosity of their parents, those categorized as avoidant experienced the highest rates of 




whether one is reenacting or compensating for an attachment experience, such studies 
seem to support the hypothesis that one‟s religious experience may be correlated with 
attachment style, life experiences vis-à-vis caregivers, and the basic human needs that 
attachment relations are designed to meet (e.g., Shealy, Bhuyan, & Sternberger, 2012).   
At first glance, it might seem that a securely attached adult would be certain of 
their relationship with god, whether affiliating or disaffiliating.  In deference to Erikson 
(1950), however, it is important to remember that secure attachment is characterized 
more by the experience of trust in others and the larger world than is insecure attachment.  
This observation suggests that a more securely attached individual might be more capable 
of tolerating a lack of certainty, which may emerge in a variety of spheres (e.g., Spaeth, 
Schwartz, Nayar, & Ma, in press).  For example, interpersonally, such individuals would 
arguably be able to tolerate the inherent uncertainties that characterize intimate 
relationships because they default to a trusting attitude towards the “other” (regardless of 
whether that “other” is perceived as a physical or a spiritual being).  In contrast, an 
insecurely attached person might be more inclined to adopt a perspective – and seek to 
experience physical and/or spiritual relationships – grounded in certainty.  In some ways, 
through such relational “foreclosure,” they might succeed in freeing themselves from the 
uncertainty of trusting in the reality of one‟s spiritual experience by “faith and not by 
sight” (e.g., as articulated by the Christian apostle Paul in his second letter to the 
Corinthian church).  On the other hand, as Mikulincer and Shaver (2001) found, when 
one‟s secure attachment schema is activated by the subliminal presentation of words that 




out-groups, even when the perspectives of such groups challenge one‟s own belief 
system. 
Historically speaking, Gordon Allport was one of the most prominent and 
enduring thinkers regarding the conceptualization and psychological study of religion.  At 
the core of his approach was the construct of the “mature religious sentiment,” which he 
described as a well differentiated and complex faith which is relatively independent of its 
origins in childhood needs, and consistently directive of a person‟s ethical standards, even 
though it is held with some level of uncertainty or doubt.  According to Allport (1969), 
such a framework “never seems satisfied unless it is dealing with matters central to all 
existence” (p. 78) and faces this profound calling “without absolute certainty...[as] the 
mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt” (p. 83).  A 
person who holds this “mature religious sentiment” sees his or her faith as a working 
hypothesis which gives a basis for values and infuses one‟s life with energy (Wulff, 
1996), a perspective that perhaps is consistent with the Biblical declaration that “faith is 
an assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1).  
From this perspective, faith is seen as an end in itself, in contrast with expressions of 
religious belief that are used instrumentally to attain other psychological, political, or 
social ends (Flere et al., 2008).  Allport labeled this first type of religious belief 
“intrinsic,” hypothesizing that it was associated with positive psychological outcomes 
(Pargament & Park., 1995).  Allport regarded the second type of religious belief 
“extrinsic” or “immature religiosity,” which seemed to accommodate psychological needs 
for security and comfort and/or to legitimate one‟s particular political or group identity 




In addition to congruence with other theorists noted above, echoes of attachment 
theory resonate here, in that religion is understood again as a means to pursue existential 
comfort and security.  According to Allport (1969), extrinsic religion can address these 
psychological needs by defining one‟s particular religious group identity against other 
groups through an attitude characterized by certainty.  Intrinsic religion, on the other 
hand, sees religious belief as a value unto itself – an appreciation of one‟s subjective 
experience of god rather than an investment in ensuring that others validate that 
subjective experience.  Rather than seeking to alleviate the existential anxiety which 
comes from a lack of certainty, intrinsic religion revels in the experience of faith itself.  
This extrinsic / intrinsic dichotomy parallels the previous proposal that while certitude 
may be associated with interreligious conflict, faith results in self-aware and humble 
conviction, which is capable, even desirous, of dialoging with those who hold differing 
religious beliefs and values (Awad & Park, 2009; Pargament & Park, 1995; Wulff, 1996).  
 
Religious Certitude and Prejudice 
Consistent with this central proposition regarding intrinsic versus extrinsic 
religiosity, it also was Allport‟s (1969) hypothesis that extrinsic religiousness was the 
source of prejudicial and authoritarian attitudes, which historically have been associated 
with religion.  Although many studies have found a correlation between religion and 
prejudice in the past, this apparent connection has proven to be complex.  For instance, 
along with non-religious persons, highly committed religious persons also have been 
found in some studies to be among the least prejudiced groups in society (e.g., Ford, 




Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002).  Allport‟s dichotomy offers plausible 
illumination regarding this potentially confusing relationship between religion and 
prejudice.  For instance, studies have indicated that intrinsic religiosity is associated with 
less prejudice towards gays, lesbians, and ethnic minorities than extrinsic religiosity.  So, 
it seems possible both to be highly committed from a religious perspective but also highly 
intrinsic, and thus less prejudiced towards others.  On the other hand, it may be that 
highly intrinsic religious persons may simply be more motivated to hide their prejudice 
(Awad & Hall-Clark, 2009).   
Although a number of conceptual and psychometric problems with Allport‟s 
intrinsic/extrinsic categorization have been illuminated (such as its ambiguity and 
presupposition of particular religious commitments), his framing of the complex 
differences in how people experience and express their religious beliefs continues to 
influence our understanding of these phenomena (Wulff, 1996).  In any case, regarding 
the relationship between religious belief and prejudice, definitive conclusions remain 
elusive, mainly because it appears that the type of religious engagement people 
experience (e.g., intrinsic versus extrinsic) may mediate the degree of prejudice that is 
experienced.  Such complexity is compounded further by the fact that religious 
commitments may range from very strong, to very weak, to non-existent (see Edmunds, 
Federico, & Mays, in press).  Hopefully, the below investigation of such processes vis-à-
vis belief certitude will provide a helpful frame for differentiating between religious 
expressions which impede – or facilitate – authentic intergroup communication and 





Religious Quest versus Religious Fundamentalism 
Although Allport (1969) saw intrinsic and extrinsic religious inclinations in 
dichotomous terms, they have not been shown to be well correlated in this way.  In fact, 
some research has supported the possibility that spiritual, psychological, and social 
motivations do not necessarily contradict one another (Pargament & Park, 1995).  In an 
attempt to address these complex interactions, Daniel Batson (1976) added a third 
orientation, “quest,” which includes constructs such as doubt, complexity, and openness 
to perspective change.  Reminiscent of the previously mentioned ideas of Immanuel Kant 
and Rollo May, the quest orientation has been described as “honestly facing existential 
questions in all their complexity, while at the same time resisting clear-cut pat answers” 
(Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993, p. 166).  Thus, those with a “quest” orientation 
perceive that they may not know the absolute truth regarding spiritual matters; however, 
they also maintain that asking questions and searching for answers are important aspects 
in the process of believing.  Previous studies have correlated a “quest” orientation with 
self-acceptance, open-mindedness, flexibility, helpfulness, and responsiveness towards 
others, while also being inversely correlated with prejudice (Batson et al.; Hunsberger, 
1995, 2005).  However, such conclusions have been questioned on grounds similar to the 
intrinsic / extrinsic orientations.  For instance, one study found that while the quest scale 
might be partially valid in Christian settings, it may not be for Muslims (Flere, Edwards, 
& Klanjsek, 2008).  Another study concluded that the prevalence of a quest orientation 
declines with age (Wulff, 1996).  Regardless, it is not difficult to apprehend the 




inquisitive inclination to grapple with one‟s own religious commitments would be 
associated with a resistance toward the certainty that “final answers” provide.       
As a point of contrast to the quest framework, an orientation toward religious 
fundamentalism also has been proposed to explain processes of certitude.  From this 
perspective, fundamentalists of various faiths typically are distinguished by the following 
deeply held beliefs; 1) one‟s particular religious perspectives are the only inerrant truth; 
2) such truth is opposed by evil forces which must be fought; 3) such beliefs must be 
followed today the way they were perceived to be followed in the past; and finally 4) 
those who endorse and follow such beliefs have a special relationship with one or more 
deities (e.g., see Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; McFarland, 1989; Shealy, 2005).  In 
fact, Altemeyer and Hunsberger have found a strong negative correlation between these 
two orientations.  Although someone with a quest orientation may share many of the 
same doctrinal perspectives as a religious fundamentalist, he or she arguably would differ 
in the level of certitude with which these perspectives are held.  In short, the quest 
orientation – with its focus on doubt, complexity, and openness to a change – is 
representative of a less “certain” holding of one‟s faith.  Religious fundamentalism, on 
the other hand, is aligned highly with certitude regarding the inerrant truth of at least 
some of its religious teachings as well as resistance towards any change in the way that 
this “truth” is understood or followed (Tan, 2009). 
Some studies have pointed to religious fundamentalism as the religious 
manifestation of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; 
Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001).  Among other levels of analysis, 




(e.g., how some oppressive Central American regimes encourage Christian missionaries 
to evangelize in their countries).  Such findings are consistent with data demonstrating 
that people are less likely to question the government after an experience of religious 
conversion (Pargament & Park, 1995).  Of course, such scholarship has strong historical 
roots.  For example, and consistent with Freud and Skinner, Karl Marx saw religion as an 
“opiate of the masses,” which militated against social unrest.  Along similar lines, 
Niccolò Machiavelli emblematically suggested that leaders should maintain the religious 
structure of their country in order to keep the people “well conducted” (Silberman et al., 
2005).  As suggested previously, a religious perspective of certitude generally would be 
associated with resistance to political changes within authoritarian-leaning regimes, along 
with their theological concomitants, as well as the inevitable cognitive and emotional 
disequilibrium that these changes would foster.  Although we have highlighted two 
perspectives of religious “quest” and religious “fundamentalism,” it should be noted that 
these are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive.  In other words, overlaps 
and variations in the two extremes also exist.  For example, a believer may hold 
fundamentalist attitudes in relation to certain doctrines, while remaining open to learning 
about new or alternative perspectives regarding other doctrines (Tan, 2009). 
 
Religious Certitude and Religious Orthodoxy 
As with most psychological constructs that bear on the interaction of religiosity 
and other attitudinal phenomena, such as prejudice, correlational trends are complex, but 
discernible.  For example, Kirkpatrick (1993) found that religious fundamentalism was 




inversely related or unrelated to each of these same scales.  For this reason, some 
researchers have looked to Christian orthodoxy (the degree to which someone has 
internalized traditional Christian tenants) as a useful measure for differentiating the 
effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and/or religious fundamentalism from actual 
religious beliefs (Ford et al., 2009; Hunsberger, 1989; Laythe et al., 2001; Laythe et al., 
2002).  Christian orthodoxy has in fact been shown to correlate with less prejudicial 
attitudes in a number of analyses.  For instance, one study confirmed that religious 
fundamentalism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism predicted negative attitudes toward 
homosexual people.  However, the same study found that Christian orthodoxy predicted 
positive attitudes towards members of this group (Eunike, 2009; Ford et al., 2009).  These 
findings seem to support a central tenet, that prejudice may be related to authoritarian 
attitudes of certitude, rather than the doctrinal content of one‟s religious belief.  
Furthermore, recent work on religious fundamentalism suggests that it too may vary in 
terms of intensity (i.e., on a continuum from high fundamentalism to low 
fundamentalism), with associations to related cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
processes.  For instance, although an individual otherwise inclined toward 
fundamentalism may not approve of a certain behavior (i.e. homosexual sex), he or she 
may still express positive feelings towards gay people if able and willing – affectively 
and cognitively –  to “separate the sinner from the sin” (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).   
 
Religious Certitude and Identity Closure 
Other research has attempted to differentiate religious persons by building on 




development.  In particular, Kiesling (2008) suggested that spiritual identity could be 
understood through the dimensions of “role salience” (the importance of spirituality to 
one‟s sense of identity) and “role flexibility” (the extent to which one has considered 
changes in his or her spiritual identity).  In this study, the “foreclosed” group was 
comprised of individuals who expressed a high commitment to their faith, but without 
much exploration of other options.  For these people, spiritual change consisted of 
deepening their current faith.  Such individuals showed few signs of reflection or doubt, 
and tended to emphasize their relationship with god as their primary religious motivation.  
The second, “moratorium” group reported high levels of religious exploration, but had 
not arrived at a place of commitment.  These individuals often reported challenging 
experiences which were associated with serious questions and doubts.  They saw 
themselves as arbiters of truth as opposed to authorities, and typically came from families 
that did not participate in religious practices.  The final “achieved” group had navigated a 
period of religious exploration that had culminated in personal religious commitments.  
Such individuals were able to describe their spiritual identity clearly and specifically, 
emphasizing an enhanced capacity to relate with others, which they attributed to their 
religious experiences and commitments.  Such individuals also were highly reflective 
about their religious ideation in the past, and expected to remain so in regards to their 
faith in the future.  However, they had experienced attenuation of their previous religious 
crisis, and now understood themselves as being more settled and spiritually at ease 
(Kiesling, 2008).  Thus, among other implications, if high fundamentalism is associated 
with prejudice, one potential antidote may be the cultivation and valuation of an ongoing 




“foreclose” religious identity via the inculcation of unshakable certitude (e.g., Spaeth et 
al., in press; Tan, 2009).  
It should be emphasized that a belief in spiritually revealed truths or inspired texts 
may well occur for individuals who otherwise lack a sense of certitude regarding these 
truths or texts.  As studies of Christian orthodoxy have illustrated, one may hold 
traditional religious beliefs in a fundamentalist/authoritarian manner, characterized by a 
form of certitude which is associated with prejudice and intergroup conflict.  However, 
one also may hold these traditional beliefs in an open/reflective manner, characterized by 
an appreciation of the apparent elusiveness of absolute certainty in regards to any truth 
claim (whether it be “religious” or “scientific”).  Furthermore, these reflective beliefs 
seem to be associated with greater interest in, and acceptance of, those who hold different 
perspectives.  In short, consistent with such scholarship, the fact that James, Leuba, 
Maslow, Jung, Erikson, and  many other thinkers grant that a faith journey and faith 
commitments have the potential to facilitate generative purposes at individual, group, and 
societal levels makes a case against throwing the proverbial “baby” of religious belief out 
with the “bathwater” of certitude. 
 
Religious Certitude and Neuroscience 
As a final consideration along these lines, recent perspectives rooted in 
neuroscience have added an entirely new level of analysis to the study of religious 
certitude.  For example, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) have provided evidence that non-
conscious processes, rather than conscious beliefs, mediate much of our behavior, 




abstract religious principles alone, may more parsimoniously explain why people behave 
as they do towards others (e.g., Haidt, 2007; Newberg & Waldman, 2006).  Such findings 
lend support to the central contention here that it is necessary, but by no means sufficient, 
to understand the content of religious belief.  Of potentially greater importance, 
particularly in relation to understanding the dynamics of inter-belief conflict, is the 
certainty with which beliefs are held as well as why such beliefs have been internalized 
with such certainty in the first place.  In other words, to understand why some individuals 
are more inclined to experience and express certitude in regards to their religious beliefs, 
we may need to account for formative variables (e.g., life history, demographics) that are 
associated with the likelihood of certitude, or the lack thereof, as well as allied affective, 
biological, and cognitive processes that may mediate or at least co-vary with the relative 
degree of religious certitude that an individual expresses (Shealy, 2005).  By accounting 
for such complexity in real time, taking into consideration individual differences among 
us, we may better be able to “make sense” of the messy complexity that culminates in a 
relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude.   
 
Examining Religious Certitude through the EI Model and BEVI Method 
Accounting for the origins of religious certitude – through an interdisciplinary, 
measurable, and nuanced understanding of the etiological factors associated with 
religiousness – has been called for in the scholarly literature (e.g., Bloom, 2007; 
Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995; Pargament & Park, 1995).  By utilizing such an 
approach, it may become feasible to parse cause and effect vis-à-vis religious certainty, 




but eschewing any definitive claims, an overview of the three main components of the 
present approach – Equilintegration (EI) Theory, the EI Self, and the Beliefs, Events, and 
Values Inventory (BEVI) – may be helpful at this juncture (see chapters 2, 3, and 4 in 
Shealy, in press, for a full explication).  Essentially, Equilintegration (EI) Theory seeks to 
explain “the processes by which beliefs, values, and „worldviews‟ are acquired and 
maintained, why their alteration is typically resisted, and how and under what 
circumstances their modification occurs" (Shealy, 2004, p. 1075).  Derivative of EI 
Theory (Shealy, 2004), the Equilintegration or EI Self (see Appendix A) explains the 
integrative and synergistic processes by which beliefs and values are acquired, 
maintained, and transformed as well as how they may be linked to the formative 
variables, core needs, and adaptive potential of the self (Shealy, in press).  Informed by 
scholarship in a range of key areas (e.g., “needs-based” research and theory; 
developmental psychopathology; social cognition; affect regulation; psychotherapy 
processes and outcomes; theories and models of “self”), the EI Self seeks to illustrate 
how the interaction between core human needs (e.g., for attachment, affiliation) and 
formative variables (e.g., caregiver, culture) often leads to particular kinds of beliefs and 
values about self, others, and the world at large, that are internalized over the course of 
development and across the life span.    
Concomitant with EI Theory and the EI Self, the Beliefs, Events, and Values 
Inventory (BEVI) is a comprehensive analytic tool in development since the early 1990s 
that examines how and why we come to see ourselves, others, and the larger world as we 
do (e.g., how life experiences, culture, and context affect our beliefs, values, and 




functioning (e.g., learning processes, relationships, personal growth, the pursuit of life 
goals).  For example, the BEVI assesses processes such as: basic openness; the tendency 
to (or not to) stereotype in particular ways; self- and emotional awareness; preferred 
strategies for making sense of why “other” people and cultures “do what they do;” global 
engagement (e.g., receptivity to different cultures, religions, and social practices); and 
worldview shift (e.g., the degree to which beliefs and values change as a result of specific 
experiences).  BEVI results are translated into reports at the individual, group, and 
organizational levels and used in a variety of contexts for applied and research purposes 
(e.g., to track and examine changes in worldviews over time) (e.g., Shealy, 2005; Shealy, 
Bhuyan, & Sternberger, 2012; for more information about the BEVI, including a 
description of scales, see chapter 4 in Shealy, in press).  
 
Research Questions and Results  
This study is exploratory in that we are attempting to understand the relationship 
between formative variables (e.g., life history, demographics), mediators (various scales 
on the BEVI), and outcomes (e.g., self-reported religious or non-religious affiliation) in a 
manner that is consistent with other analytic work with this measure.  Analyses were 
developed on the basis of a large dataset (N = 2331) collected during 2011 - 2012 from 
the Forum BEVI Project, a multi-institution, multi-year project coordinated by the Forum 
on Education Abroad (www.forumea.org) and the International Beliefs and Values 
Institute (www.ibavi.org).  Participants primarily included undergraduate students 
(96.7%), although a small sample of graduate students (3.3%) also was included, all of 




residential learning communities, general education courses with a focus on 
transformative / multicultural learning).  The sample ranged between the ages of 17 and 
62, with an average age of 19; 3.9% fell into the age range of 26 to 62, with another .9 % 
falling into the range of 12 to 17, and the majority falling between the ages of 18 and 25.  
Although the majority of participants reported as U.S. citizens (93.3%), non-U.S. citizens 
also were included in the sample (6.7%) resulting in representation from 38 different 
countries of origin.  Of the sample, 79.1 percent reported as Caucasian with 20.9 percent 
as non-Caucasian (6.6 percent Black or African American; .9 percent American Indian or 
Alaskan Native; 7.4 percent Asian or Pacific Islander; 2.9 percent Hispanic / Latino; 3 
percent Other).  Finally, from the standpoint of gender, 40.8 percent of the sample was 
female, with 59.2 percent male.  All participants were required to provide informed 
consent as determined by multiple Institutional Review Boards processes, and 
participation was entirely voluntary.  Participants were not required to complete the 
BEVI, and could elect to discontinue participation at any time.  Analyses were conducted 
via SPSS and MPLUS, and consist of ANOVAs, regression analyses, and Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM).  More information on the Forum BEVI Project is available in 
chapter 4 (Shealy, in press) and at www.ibavi.org/content/featured-projects.  Our data 
analyses for this exploratory study will focus on addressing five interrelated questions: 1) 
how does the BEVI operationalize religious certitude; 2) who is most likely, from a 
demographic standpoint, to score highly on the BEVI‟s measurement of this construct; 3) 
how does the BEVI‟s measurement of religious certitude relate to other BEVI scales; 4) 




5) to what extent do specific formative variables (e.g., family history) predict religious 
certitude.    
 
Question 1: How does the BEVI operationalize religious certitude? 
 On the BEVI, the Socioreligious Traditionalism scale likely is related to “religious 
certitude” as discussed above, as it consists of items indicating strong, traditional 
religious beliefs, a relatively unquestioning stance vis-à-vis one‟s faith, assuredness 
regarding God‟s tangible role in this life and the hereafter, and a fundamentalist 
sensibility regarding sociocultural issues.  Sample items include:  
God’s word is good enough for me. 
I am a religious person. 
Sometimes bad things happen because it’s God’s will. 
Homosexuality goes against God’s design. 
I know that evil people go to hell when they die. 
Therefore, it is our hypothesis that high scores on this scale will be related to this 
common form of religious certitude.  Such perspective should be delineated from 
certainty regarding transcendental or spiritual inclinations more generally, since this scale 
is not a criterion-based measurement of the “religious certitude” construct.  Rather, given 
its Likert-type structure (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree), this scale 
is hypothesized to vary according to the content of one‟s religious belief as well as the 
certainty with which one holds such beliefs.  In short, for present purposes, the higher the 





Question 2: Who is most likely to evidence a greater degree of Socioreligious 
Traditionalism on the BEVI? 
 As Table 1 illustrates, for this sample at least, regression analyses suggest that 
there are a number of significant differences on the BEVI regarding who is most, and 
least, likely to score highly on Socioreligious Traditionalism.
2
  Of particular note, at an 
initial level of analysis (i.e., other variables also differentiate these groups), individuals 
who report that they are Republican, Christian, or Islamic all are significantly more likely 
to endorse a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism whereas individuals who report 
that they are atheists and agnostics are significantly less likely to endorse a high degree of 
Socioreligious Traditionalism.  Such characteristics, combined with the correlation matrix 
                                                          
2
 Other marital status refers to marital status other than "Divorced," "Married," "Single," and 
"Widowed." 
Paying college education by oneself refers to the source of college education payment (1=paying 
college education by oneself; 0= someone rather than oneself paying for college education).  Years of 
foreign languages learning prior to college or university indicates the years the participant spent on 
learning foreign languages before attending the college.  Speak French simply indicates that the 
respondent speaks French as a foreign language; likewise, to answer how many days of a week the 
respondent reads a news magazine, or uses an online social network during study abroad, the 
respondent simply provides an estimation of days or hours respectively spent per week.  To ascertain 
interest in international education or study abroad, the dependent variable is a student‟s level of interest.  
The question is as follows: "On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being „extremely low‟ and 7 being „extremely 
high,‟ please indicate your level of personal interest in international education or study abroad 
experiences." The independent variables are demographic and experiential variables.  Several of the 
independent variables are dummy variables: gender (0 = male, 1 = female); “parents paying for 
international experience” (0 = parents do not pay, 1 = parents pay); “university provides orientation for 
international experience” (0 = university does not provide, 1 = university provides); “plan to travel 
abroad” (0 = no plan to travel abroad, 1= plan to travel abroad); “plan to take an internationally focused 
course” (0 = no plan to take a course, 1 = plan to take a course); and, “speak a foreign language other 
than English” (0 = does not speak a foreign language, 1 = speaks a foreign language).  Another 
independent variable, the "highest academic degree intended to achieve” is coded from 1 = associate 
degree, 2 = bachelor‟s, 3 = master's, 4 = specialist (e.g., Ed.S), 5 = professional (e.g., law), 6 = doctoral 
degree. Also, participants are asked about the number of foreign countries they have previously visited 
(e.g., respondents indicate the actual number of countries they have visited). Background variables 
include “mother‟s education” and “family income.” “Mother's education” indicates the highest 
academic degree of a respondent's mother, which ranges from 0 = some high school or less to 8 = 
doctoral degree. "Family income” is an ordinal variable that reflects the average annual income of a 
student's parents/guardians regardless if the student receives financial support from them. Income 





findings presented next, provide insight into what this particular factor of Socioreligious 
Traditionalism is measuring on the BEVI.   
 
Table 1  
Background characteristics of individuals who score more highly on Socioreligious 
Traditionalism 
      Unstandardized Coefficients    Standardized Coefficients 
Scales                                               B             Std. Error          Beta             t             Sig. 
Constant 2.069 0.068  30.547 0.00 
Other marital status -0.302 0.115 -0.044 -2.627 0.01 
Political orientation is 
Republican 
0.314 0.033 0.171 9.608 0.00 
Religious orientation is 
Atheism 
-0.303 0.062 -0.114 -4.901 0.00 
Religious orientation is 
Agnosticism 
-0.398 0.065 -0.139 -6.157 0.00 
Religious orientation is 
Christianity 
0.707 0.049 0.387 14.304 0.00 
Religious orientation is Islam 0.845 0.177 0.083 4.783 0.00 
Personal interest in 
international activities  
-0.026 0.009 -0.051 -2.85 0.004 
Paying college education by 
oneself  
-0.061 0.029 -0.035 -2.077 0.038 
Years of foreign languages  
learning prior to college or 
university  
-0.033 0.007 -0.082 -4.605 0.00  
Speak French as a foreign 
language  
-0.081 0.036 -0.038 -2.226 0.026 
Days of a week read a weekly 
news magazine  
0.041 0.017 0.043 2.478 0.013 
Hours  per week using an 
online social network during 
study abroad  
0.011 0.004 0.052 3.033 0.002 
F 109.379***     
R-square 0.373     





Question 3: How is religious certitude on the BEVI related to other belief / value 
structures?   
 As indicated above, one of the more complex but salient dimensions of religious 
certitude is how it is, or is not, related to other aspects of how people experience self, 
others, and the larger world.  For example, as previously mentioned, there is a distinction 
between religious fundamentalism and religious orthodoxy, with those scoring high on 
the later construct tending to exhibit less prejudice and intolerance than those who 
express high levels of religious fundamentalism.  Given these previous findings, what 
might Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI illustrate about the relationship of its 
particular form of religious certitude to other belief / value constructs and processes?  As 
Table 2 illustrates, correlation matrix findings from the BEVI show the following 













                                                          
3
 These data represent interfactor correlations among BEVI scales.  More information about the BEVI, 
including EFA parameters as well as correlation matrix data, is available at 





Correlation matrix findings of Socioreligious Traditionalism and other BEVI scales 
Scale 15. Socioreligious Traditionalism 
Sociocultural Openness (-.62)  
Ecological Resonance (-.53)  
Basic Closedness (.34)  
Gender Traditionalism (.34)  
Needs Closure (.31)  
Hard Structure (.27)  
Identity Closure (.24)  
Emotional Attunement (-.20) 
 
How do we interpret these findings?  Essentially, those individuals who score highly on  
Socioreligious Traditionalism also tend to be:  
 much less likely to be interested in and open to cultures and cultural practices that 
are different from their own (Sociocultural Openness);  
 much less likely to be concerned about environmental processes such as climate 
change or the degradation of natural resources (Ecological Resonance);  
 more likely to deny basic thoughts, feelings, and needs that are common or typical 
for most human beings (Basic Closedness);  
 more likely to express traditional and conservative beliefs about who men and 




 more likely to indicate that basic needs were not met in a good enough way during 
their upbringing (Needs Closure);  
 more likely to report that they have few doubts or regrets and are seldom caught 
off guard (Hard Structure);  
 more likely to express confusion or “stuckness” regarding who they are or where 
they are going in their life (Identity Diffusion); and, 
 less likely to have access, and/or be responsive, to their affect or the affect of 
others (Emotional Attunement).   
Overall then, the more likely it is that one experiences certitude regarding the beliefs 
represented by the Socioreligious Traditionalism scale on the BEVI, the less likely it is 
that this same individual, on average, will be open to or interested in different cultures, 
environmental issues, and other important aspects of self, such as how and why we and 
others function as we do.        
 
Question 4: What variance in religious certitude exists both within and between 
religious groups?   
This complex question is perhaps one of the most important to answer if we are to 
understand the explanatory value of grouping people by their particular religious or non-
religious demographic category (Christian, atheist, agnostic, etc.).  For example, as the 
previously reviewed data suggest (e.g., regarding the differences between self-identified 
Fundamentalist Christians and Orthodox Christians), groups that self-identify with the 
same overarching category (in this case Christian) appear at times to differ tremendously 




By extension then, could it be that some individuals who self-report as Christian might 
have more in common with individuals who do not identify as Christian?  For example, 
might it be possible that some atheists and Christians actually share more in common 
than they do with agnostics, who presumably are open to the possibilities of either 
category, and thus are less likely to express certitude regarding transcendental matters?  
Although preliminary and necessitating further investigation, several BEVI analyses offer 
intriguing findings along these lines.  Consider Table 3, which addresses beliefs 
regarding the economics of social welfare as well as Table 4, which deals with basic 









   
Comparisons among Atheists, Agnostics, and Christians on the following BEVI item regarding 









Corrected Model 17.891  7 2.556 4.275 0.00 
Intercept 19951.125  1 19951.125 33369.71 0.00 
Religious Orientation 17.891  7 2.556 4.275 0.00 
Atheism  3.045     
Agnosticism  3.132     
Buddhism  3.189     
Christianity  2.9     
Hinduism  3.154     
Islam  3.176     
Judaism  2.968     
Other  3.019     
Error 1358.984  2273 0.598   
Total 21328  2281    










What may we observe about such findings?  Due to their relatively large sample 
size, let‟s focus on atheism, Christianity, and agnosticism.  First, although mean 
differences among groups are not large, atheists and Christians from this sample appear 
to believe similarly on both of these items regarding social welfare and cultural 
understanding.  Second, agnostics are significantly more likely to agree that there is too 
big a gap between the rich and poor in our country, and that we should try to understand 
cultures that are different from our own.  Such findings are interesting at a number of 
levels, including the seemingly salient fact that a central tenet of Christianity is that the 
 
Table 4   
 
Comparisons among Atheists, Agnostics, and Christians on the following BEVI item 
regarding knowledge of other cultures: "We should try to understand cultures that are 









Corrected Model 11.601  7 1.657 4.046 0.00 
Intercept 26815.29  1 26815.29 65464.98 0.00 
Religious 
Orientation 
11.601  7 1.657 4.046 0.00 
Atheism  3.382     
Agnosticism  3.578     
Buddhism  3.568     
Christianity  3.378     
Hinduism  3.692     
Islam  3.588     
Judaism  3.563     
Other  3.4     
Error 942.109  2300 0.41   
Total 27769  2308    




plight of the poor should be prominent in the thinking of Christians (Singer, 2009).  It 
should be emphasized that all three of these groups for this sample – of university level 
students – are inclined to agree with both statements.  Also, some of the variance in the 
rich/poor item might also be related to the moral attributions one makes about the 
existence of a large rich/poor gap (e.g. some might argue that it is not the size of the gap 
that is immoral, but rather the lack of care for the poor that is morally reprehensible).  
That said, such findings are surprising nonetheless, and worthy of further consideration.  
Most notably, the intriguing if not ironic finding that agnostics are more likely to endorse 
both beliefs, particularly regarding the issue of rich and poor, raises the question of 
whether this group may be more inclined toward a basic tenet of Christianity than are 
self-reported Christians.  Likewise, the finding that atheists and Christians are similar in 
their level of openness towards the “other” (i.e., both groups are less open than agnostics) 
might be surprising, particularly in light of Dawkins‟ (2006) assertion that atheism is the 
solution to many of the world‟s most pressing conflicts (e.g., we‟d be better off and less 
conflictual if we‟d but abandon religion), his negative beliefs about Christianity, and his 
skeptical views of agnosticism.   
Additional context from this perspective may be helpful at this point, since 
Dawkins (2006) has much to say about agnostics, dividing them into two types. 
“Temporary Agnosticism in Practice” (TAP) is defined as “legitimate fence-sitting where 
there really is a definite answer, one way or another, but we so far lack the evidence to 
reach it” (p. 47).  In contrast, “Permanent Agnosticism in Principle” (PAP) “is 
appropriate for questions that can never be answered, no matter how much evidence we 




as I do.”  That is because, “Maybe your red is my green, or something completely 
different from any color that I can imagine…philosophers cite this question as one that 
can never be answered” (p. 47).  Dawkins appears to be arguing that the only legitimate 
form of agnosticism vis-à-vis a belief in God is the TAP form.  Thus, from his 
perspective, “even if God‟s existence is never proved or disproved with certainty one way 
or the other, available evidence and reasoning may yield an estimate of probability far 
from 50 per cent” (p. 50).  Here is not the place for a full exploration of why Dawkins 
would express such certitude regarding his own presentation of “available evidence” – 
much less his own “reasoning” – except to say that many scholars from across the 
interdisciplinary spectrum question absolutist rational atheism of the very form promoted 
by Dawkins, by noting its unacknowledged assumptions, privileged methodologies, 
underlying epistemologies, and internal contradictions (e.g., Eagleton, 2006; Keller, 
2008; Nagel, 1997; Plantinga, 1993).  Setting such ongoing debate aside, suffice it to say 
that abundant evidence suggests we all should exercise due skepticism of our own 
reasoning, as it appears subject to many empirically demonstrable biasing factors (e.g., 
Aronson, 2012; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  From such a perspective, certitude about the 
indisputably false status of religious beliefs is no more defensible than certitude about the 
indisputably true nature of such beliefs.  As Shealy (2005) observes, “believing 
something to be „the real truth‟ – even vehemently –  has no more power to make it so 
than nonbelief has the power to make it not so” (p. 84).  Moreover, pertinent to fervent 
believers in religion and non-religion, 
…the fact that we all possess beliefs and values is not sufficient to confer 




right, or better simply because they are held to be so…To insist otherwise is like 
asserting that English is superior to French simply because you speak the former, 
as do your parents, children, and most everyone else you know.  Although the 
absurdity of such logic (the non-logic) should be painfully apparent to us all, our 
history as a species indicates it is not.  Instead, what we too often seem to „know 
for sure‟ – with a steely confidence that belies the fanatic in us all – is a tautology 
that our beliefs and values are right by virtue of the fact that they are ours (p. 
102). 
 In short, despite all of the emphasis on the putative differences between Christians 
and atheists (Dawkins, 2006), such differences are not clearly found in the above 
examples, thus creating important questions regarding the utility and validity of 
perceiving entire groups of people (e.g., Christians or atheists) either as ineluctably 
different or similar in their beliefs and values.  Moreover, from the standpoint of religious 
certitude, it would appear that individuals who theoretically would appear to be least 
inclined toward certitude – agnostics – also are more inclined to believe that that is too 
large of a gap between the rich and poor, and that there is value in understanding cultures 
that are different from their own.  These findings are consistent with the correlation 
matrix data presented above, which suggest that individuals high in Socioreligious 
Traditionalism – our proxy for religious certitude – are less likely to express a sense of 
interest in or openness to issues and groups that are different from one‟s own (e.g. 





Question 5: Are specific formative variables associated with a higher degree of 
religious certitude as expressed via Socioreligious Traditionalism? 
 Finally, as we conclude our analyses, an even more basic question may be asked, 
which has to do with the etiological and mediational factors that are associated with a 
relative degree of openness in general, and certitude in particular.  More specifically, 
what life experiences appear to be associated with a relative degree of socioreligiously 
traditional certitude or lack thereof?  On the one hand, mild to moderate evidence from 
the BEVI suggests that individuals who report a greater degree of Negative Life Events 
tend to be more likely to report a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism.  Such a 
conclusion is based in part upon correlation matrix data presented above which indicated 
a significant (.0001) and positive (.31) correlation between Socioreligious Traditionalism 
and Needs Closure, a scale that measures the degree to which individuals report 
distressing life experiences associated with core needs not being met.   
Despite such findings, the non-linear nature of such causal processes should be 
emphasized, as illustrated by the following Structural Equation Models (SEM), which 
demonstrate that the mediators of Socioreligious Traditionalism and Christian identity are 
complex and worthy of further study.  Consider Figure 1, which examines the 
relationship between Positive Family Relations (the degree to which individuals report a 
happy upbringing and positive relations with their caregivers), Identity Diffusion (the 




are and whether they have agency to move forward in life), and the outcome variable of 






Note: X2=1964.837, df=124, p=0.0000, RMSEA=0.080, CF1=0.906. 
 
Figure 1. Structural equation model illustrating the relationship between Positive Family 
Relations, Identity Diffusion, and identification as Christian. 
 
What do such findings suggest?  Essentially, individuals who report that they experienced 
Positive Family Relations – and report Caucasian ethnic status, a higher family income, 
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 From an interpretive standpoint, Positive Family Relations is a CFA derived factor comprised of items 
regarding how positively an individual reports their upbringing and family environment were (e.g., a 
positive value indicates a greater degree of positive life events).  Ethnicity is a dummy measured 
variable; value "0" indicates the respondent is a minority, and "1" means the respondent is a Caucasian.  
Disability also is a dummy variable; “0” indicates the person is not eligible to services for students with 
disabilities, and 1 means otherwise. Family income is measured by a series of numbers indicating the 
respondent's annual family income. It ranges from "1" (Less than $10,000) to "10"($175,000 or more). 
Both father's education and mother's education are ordinal measured variables. They range from "0" 
(Some high school or less) to "8" (Doctoral degree). Finally, we used WLSMV (weighted least squares, 
robust standard errors, and mean and variance adjusted chi square test statistic) as the estimator for all 

























and no disability diagnosis – are less likely to report that they are confused, stuck, or lost 
in their own life.  At the same time, individuals who are high in Identity Diffusion also 
are less likely to report that they are Christian.  These findings are interesting at several 
levels, but perhaps mostly because they suggest that Positive Family Relations may in 
fact be associated with a propensity to self-report as Christian when one does not feel a 
sense of being lost or confused about one‟s own identity or life.  In other words, Positive 
Family Relations may be associated with a higher degree of clarity about one‟s own self 
and life purpose, which may – for families which are inclined toward a Christian 
orientation – be further associated with such status.  But do such findings apply only to 
Christians in general or also more specifically to those Christians who are high on 


















Note: X2=1000.668, df=108, p=0.0000, RMSEA=0.060, CF1=0.976. 
Figure 2. Structural equation model illustrating the relationship between Positive Family 
Relations, Socioreligious Traditionalism, and identification as Christian. 
 
What does this model suggest?  Essentially, it appears that Positive Family Relations may 
indeed be associated with a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism, which in any 
case, is strongly associated with the tendency to self-report as Christian.  Interestingly, 
from the standpoint of formative variables, it also should be noted that the higher the 
degree of education the mother is reported to have, the lower the degree of Socioreligious 
Traditionalism individuals tend to report, which is an interesting variable worthy of 
further study (e.g., why would mother‟s education, but not father‟s, be associated with a 


























Concluding Perspectives on Religious Certitude 
The above findings suggest five concluding points.  First, in exploring certitude 
generally, and religious certitude in particular, it is important to operationalize our 
definitions.  As with all macro-level constructs – such as love, intelligence, or certitude – 
from the standpoint of measurement and research, an item level of analysis should be a 
first point of inquiry.  Much confusion occurs in the scholarly literature due to the fact 
that different item constellations are used to define similar constructs; therefore, it is 
important that researchers carefully consider the content of the items used in order to 
properly contextualize the applicability of their conclusions.  Future research 
investigating the correlations between Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI and 
other existing measures of religion/spirituality and certitude might help to better elucidate 
these dynamics and consolidate existing findings.  Hopefully, the above sample items 
will provide a clear understanding of how religious certitude is operationalized on the 
BEVI, which may facilitate further such research.      
Second, psychological constructs may be understood better by researching who is, 
and is not, likely to embody them.  In the current analysis, we learn, for example, that 
Christian Republicans are more likely to score high on Socioreligious Traditionalism, 
which would perhaps be expected, and offers important information regarding the 
meaning and validity of the construct.  Along these same lines, however, and perhaps 
more telling, individuals who self-report as Islamic, also demonstrate heightened scores 
on Socioreligious Traditionalism, suggesting that this construct may capture 




Third, a tendency toward socioreligious certitude appears predictive of a wide 
range of self structures.  As the above correlation matrix data illustrate, if one knows 
something about an individual‟s beliefs along the lines of Socioreligious Traditionalism, 
it is possible to derive empirically-informed hypotheses regarding how these same 
individuals are likely to regard other cultures or be disposed toward environmental issues 
as well as how inclined they may be to acknowledge basic thoughts and feelings in self or 
other.  Such awareness also suggests that it is important to regard the “self” as a complex 
and interdependent whole that is greater than the sum of its discrete parts, including but 
not limited to one‟s religious faith or lack thereof (see chapters 2 and 3 in Shealy, in 
press).    
Fourth, within group differences may be greater than between group differences, 
which suggests the need to eschew stereotypes about religious and non-religious people.  
On the one hand, the above data do suggest that people who are high on Socioreligious 
Traditionalism may also be less open to other cultures, less concerned about the 
environment, and so forth.  However, that tentative conclusion is very different from 
concluding either that all Christians are high on Socioreligious Traditionalism, or that all 
atheists are more open to other cultures than all Christians.  Although this point may 
seem evident, scholarly and popular discourse (e.g., painting all Christians or all atheists 
with the same brush) suggests that such affectively laden labels are highly subject to 
stereotyping if not prejudice, which Aronson (2012) astutely defines as “a hostile or 
negative attitude toward a distinguishable group on the basis of generalizations derived 
from faulty or incomplete information” (p. 299).  From that perspective, popular scholars 




and agnostics – and prejudicial towards another – atheists – by erroneously ignoring both 
the differences within all of these groups, and overstating the differences between them.  
A more sophisticated understanding of the variables that are associated with particular 
self-referencing categories is likely to go beyond a descriptive level of analysis (e.g., 
whether one calls oneself an atheist, Christian, or agnostic), instead seeking to understand 
to what degree, and under what circumstances, such self-reporting labels apply.  In short, 
questions of how and why we believe as we do are at least as, if not more, important than 
questions of what we believe if we truly are to apprehend the complex and interacting 
factors that culminate in “certitude” of whatever stripe.   
Fifth, the relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude an individual 
expresses may be highly determined, but in a complex, interacting, and non-linear 
manner.  On the one hand, individuals who are higher on Socioreligious Traditionalism 
are more likely to report a strong commitment to a religious tradition (e.g., Christianity).  
Moreover, unhappy life experiences associated with a lack of needs closure also are 
associated with a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism.  However, as the above 
SEM results suggest, unhappy life experience are neither necessary nor sufficient 
antecedents to the development of religious certitude, since a subset of Christians, who 
also report Positive Family Relations, are inclined to be higher in Socioreligious 
Traditionalism.  Thus, a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism may occur in 
families that are experienced as positive or negative, although such status may be more 
likely with backgrounds that are of the latter (more negative) variety.  At the same time, 
the tendency to self-report as Christian does not appear to be associated either with a 




closure related to early life events tends to be associated with a greater degree of religious 
certitude vis-à-vis socioreligious traditionalism, such reported experiences are neither 
necessary nor sufficient in terms of predicting this belief constellation.  Thus, in 
attempting to understand the etiology of certitude, we must account for complex 
interactions among a range of formative variables, keeping individual differences 
forefront, and thereby avoiding a “one size fits all” mentality.   
 
Agnosticism and the Continuum of Belief 
We began this dissertation by observing that one‟s tendency toward certitude 
regarding religious matters appears to be among the chief causes of conflict between 
individuals and groups.  That is likely because if and when individuals are “sure” of their 
beliefs and values, they are less able to tolerate the possibility that they may be wrong, or 
not completely right, thus militating against empathic engagement with another‟s 
perspective (Shealy, 2005).  In our view, the data that we have presented here affirm and 
deepen this perspective, by illustrating that we know relatively little about someone based 
on their endorsement of a general term to describe who they are, such as Christian or 
atheist.  This observation emerges from the finding that, from the standpoint of the BEVI, 
religious designations may encompass more differences than similarities among 
adherents in regards to how they interact with self, other, and the larger world.  For 
example, some Christians ironically may share more in common from a self-structure 
perspective (e.g., their capacity and inclination to experience and express affect) with 
their atheist peers than with those who tend to experience less religious certitude, such as 




reality for a subgroup of individuals who self-identify as Christians, since from this 
perspective they may have less in common with their brethren than those who do not self-
identify as Christian.  In other words, a lack of certainty in one‟s belief regarding 
transcendental matters (whether that belief be most akin to Christianity, agnosticism, 
atheism, or any other label) seems more predictive of one‟s ability to interact openly with 
those who hold other perspectives than any particular religious/non-religious group 
affiliation.  Thus, although preliminary and subject to further study, it may be that self-
identified Christians and other believers in a specific religious system who hold their 
faith without a sense of absolute certainty (e.g., which could perhaps be referred to as 
“Agnostic Christians,” “Agnostic Hindus,” etc.) might in fact be quite open in relation to 
other members of their religious group.  Along the same lines, atheists who avowedly are 
non-agnostic (which could perhaps be referred to as “Fundamentalist Atheists”) may 
have much in common – from a certitude perspective – with “Fundamentalist Christians” 
who also are avowedly non-agnostic.  Thus and again, it behooves us to be careful about 
concluding anything regarding the basic psychological structure of individuals who 
reportedly adhere to a specific religious or non-religious affiliation without knowing 
much more about their formative variables and larger belief / value structures, since the 
differences within such groups may be much larger that the differences between them.  
Overall, then, what may we conclude from such an analysis?  From our 
perspective, an agnostic approach which lacks certainty regarding transcendental issues 
may represent the most intellectually defensible framework on matters over which 
scientifically definitive conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and 




militates against shrill diatribes and destructive behaviors toward individuals and groups 
who “believe” differently.  As Shealy (in press) observes in relation to belief, religious 
and otherwise, via the “Continuum of Belief,”  
one may be sympathetically noncommitted (i.e., inclined to believe but ultimately 
noncommittal) or skeptically noncommitted (i.e., inclined to disbelieve but 
ultimately noncommittal).  From the standpoint of the Continuum of Belief, then, 
“agnostic” encompasses any of the “noncomitted” designations, which is 
consistent with the scope and intent of the term, “agnostic,” meaning “without” 
(„a‟) “knowledge” („gnosis‟). 
Thus, to declare oneself agnostic is to concede the inability to assert unequivocally the 
certainty of knowledge.   
By way of illustration, consider “Figure 3” from the “Continuum of Belief” as it 
relates directly to our discussion (see chapter 2 in Shealy, in press).  
 
 
Figure 3. Continuum of Belief. 
 
From the standpoint of the EI Model and BEVI method,  
beliefs typically exist in a synergistic relationship to one another in that a belief 
stated in one direction typically is matched by one or more counterpart beliefs that 




designated as 1) solo or paired (i.e., indicating whether an opposite match has 
been demonstrated statistically); 2) predictive at the high, medium, or low level 
(i.e., essentially indicative of correlative strength in the positive or negative 
direction); and 3) predictive of a match or non-match (i.e., whether two beliefs, 
and two or more individuals holding them, are likely to be “compatible – 
matched” or “incompatible – non-matched” – in terms of worldview) (Shealy, in 
press).    
So, one may hold a belief (including, but not limited to religious) with relative degrees of 
agnostic commitment up until the state of certitude.  As noted above, this point is 
revelatory in relation to the putative dichotomy between atheism and Christianity because 
the labels of “Christian” or atheist” offer little by way of explicating where someone 
actually may fall within these self-reported designations.  Since within group differences 
often are greater than between group differences vis-à-vis beliefs and values, it is very 
important to ascertain where individuals and groups actually reside along the Continuum 
of Belief.”  Revelatory of individual differences among us, and by way of explication,  
consider [Figure 3] in relation to Huan, Eleanor, and Ana.  Recall that the two 
beliefs of [Figure 3] are strongly and negatively correlated (i.e., paired, but highly 
incompatible and highly predictive of a non-match between two different 
believers).  Let‟s say Huan strongly agrees with the belief, God’s word is good 
enough for me.  Statistically speaking, Huan therefore is highly likely to disagree 
strongly with the belief, Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than 
good.  Likewise, now consider “Eleanor,” who represents the mirror opposite of 




agreeing that Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good.  On the 
Continuum of Belief, if other item pairings follow this same pattern, which is 
statistically predicted, both Huan and Eleanor likely fall under “Committed 
Certitude” on opposite ends of the Continuum of Belief.  Now consider a third 
example from “Ana,” who disagrees that God’s word is good enough for me AND 
disagrees that Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good.  Where 
would Ana fall along the Continuum of Belief?  Probably not under “Committed 
Certitude,” and more likely under “Noncommited Equivocation.”  Consistent with 
BEVI data presented later (e.g., correlation matrix and SEM), the fact that Ana 
appears to hold complexity in this way – disagreeing that “God‟s word is good 
enough” BUT also disagreeing that “religion does more harm than good,” 
suggests that she is grappling with fundamental questions regarding her own 
beliefs vis-à-vis religion and spirituality, and remains open to a range of possible  
truths (Shealy, in press).
5
 
Among other implications of the above scenario, it is important to understand that 
both a strong atheist commitment and strong religious commitment – that of Eleanor and 
Huan respectively – are expressions of belief.  To be clear, then, “atheism is not non-
belief” (Shealy, in press).  Some atheists may contend, for example, that a belief in God 
is false, but from the standpoint of the larger definition of belief provided here, such a 
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 Of course, all manner of variation may occur along this continuum when we juxtapose beliefs at an item 
level of analysis.  Consider “Luis,” for example, who agrees quite strongly that God’s word is good 
enough for me AND agrees somewhat less strongly that Sometimes I think that religion does more harm 
than good.  Perhaps on further qualitative inquiry regarding how Luis justifies his seemingly 
contradictory position, he might express his belief that “God‟s word” contains some real truths which 
have stood the test of time, but that difficulties and abuses of interpretation and application have led to 
situations where religions sometimes seem to do more harm than good.  Where would Luis fall along 
the Continuum of Belief?  He seemingly would fall at Committed Investment on one side (Sometimes I 
think that religion does more harm than good) and Noncommitted Sympathy on the other end side 




contention is still a belief that there is no God.  For the foreseeable future then, just as 
proof for the existence of God or some other transcendent reality seems improbable (e.g., 
empirically, unequivocally), so also does proof for the non-existence of such an entity or 
phenomenon.  In short, it is our sense that agnosticism most closely approximates the 
apparent reality that in fact, it is extremely unlikely that the existence or non-existence of 
God will be proven in a way that would be empirically and unequivocally valid for all 
human beings who grapple with this fundamental question.  We therefore endorse 
alignment with agnosticism, broadly defined, as Agnostic Christians, Agnostic Muslims, 
Agnostic Atheists, Agnostic Agnostics, and so forth.   
In the final analysis, there are at least two advantages of such a stance.  First, 
through an attitude of agnosticism writ large, we have the best chance of achieving 
openness toward the potential truth or goodness contained in a given worldview, while 
simultaneously not eliminating the possibility of learning from other worldviews that 
may, on the face of it, seem irreconcilable with our own.  Second, this agnostic stance 
hedges also against the perilous human tendency toward certitude, by granting that the 
beliefs and values we acquire largely are due to deterministic formative variables and 
extant contingencies of which we may have little awareness (e.g., Aronson, 2012; Shealy, 
2005).  By resisting the foreclosed security provided by certitude, we might live more 
honestly in terms of the complexities we face (i.e., not knowing for sure, „one way or the 
other‟), while simultaneously recognizing that human perceptions inevitably are inclined 
toward error – thus abiding in accord with Saint Augustine‟s timeless adage, “I error, 
therefore I am.”  In short, experiencing and expressing a spirit of agnosticism along the 




dialogue, since it declares neither that the other‟s beliefs certainly are wrong nor that 
one‟s own beliefs certainly are right. 
Thus far, it has been implied but should be explicit that our support for an 
agnostic perspective is based in an agnostic theory of knowledge, which subsequently 
leads to a commitment to agnosticism in our beliefs (i.e., we should recognize that the 
validity of all knowledge claims rely on a priori assumptions).  Moreover, it is our sense 
– although subject to further inquiry – that “absolute certitude” of a religious variety 
probably is more akin to a fundamentalist, rather than an orthodox, worldview in most 
cases.  This perspective is supported by the evidence, discussed above, regarding the 
relative degree of non-prejudicial beliefs espoused by the latter group of religious 
adherents (i.e., Christian orthodoxy, when separated from Fundamentalism, seems to 
neutralize and in some cases reverse religion‟s lamentable association with prejudice).  
Finally, we must neither ignore nor devalue the associations between religious belief and 
positive statuses at a range of levels (e.g., emotional well-being).  In fact, strong 
convictions regarding religious doctrines that value engagement and appreciation of an 
individual‟s experiential self may lead to more positive outcomes related to psychology‟s 
goal of preserving individual “freedom of inquiry and expression,” broadly defined 
(American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 2; Silberman et al., 2005; Tan, 2009; Van 
den Bos et al., 2006).  Further, it also is possible that high levels of certitude may actually 
promote a “believer‟s” relationship with others, at least within a similar sphere of belief, 
as the above SEM data imply.  
So, while religious certitude seems related to intergroup conflict and violence 




autonomy, such an outcome is not necessarily inevitable.  Some less severe forms of 
religious belief may motivate a believer to avoid shrill diatribes and demonstrate 
constructive (rather than destructive) behaviors towards people of a different faith.  For 
example, it is possible for a Christian who strongly believes in the doctrinal impetus to 
“love your neighbor as yourself” also to be more fervent in this regard than an agnostic 
who feels less certitude in his or her obligations and affinities toward fellow human 
beings.  Perhaps it is the case, then, that high levels of non-absolute certitude – when 
coexisting with an agnostic theory of knowledge – may best be expressed through the 
term investment as indicated in the Continuum of Belief.  This term delineates such 
inclinations from absolutistic certitude, and allows room for the valuing of each human‟s 
authentic experiential self, which an absolutistic certitude may see as corrupting of or 
antithetical to its “truth.”   
In the end, our preference for an agnostic stance vis-à-vis transcendental matters 
is bolstered by the fundamental point that it appears possible to be invested in one‟s 
beliefs while still retaining a non-rejecting and non-prejudicial stance toward those who 
believe differently.  Certainly, from the standpoint of the BEVI, profiles are not 
uncommon in which people are very high, or very low, on Socioreligious Traditionalism 
– a common expression of high or low religious certainty – and still evidence openness or 
closedness to other ways of experiencing self, others, and the larger world.  The existence 
of these “outliers” is one of the central reasons why it is important not to overgeneralize 
from religious or non-religious beliefs.  Even though such beliefs are among the most 
powerful (i.e., highly predictive of other worldviews on the BEVI), it still is common to 




and similarities in worldview, a point which should be recognized when assessing and 
interacting with people of different religious or non-religious sensibilities. 
 
Real World Implications and Applications: Toward Cross-Cultural Religious Education 
In light of the above theory and data, how do we address such complexity – the 
promotion of agnostic openness and investment in religious/non-religious meaning 
making, as opposed to certitude – in the real world?   Overall, we recommend educational 
and psychological interventions that encourage critical reflective thinking about the 
religious or non-religious systems of thought to which each of us is exposed.  As noted 
above, from our perspective, commitment both to religious (e.g., major religions of the 
world) and non-religious (e.g., atheism) systems of thought are forms of faith, to the 
degree that their adherents profess a belief in the fundamental but non-provable tenets 
that underlie them.  In other words, both a fundamentalist Muslim and a fundamentalist 
atheist are expressing their “faith,” since in both cases it appears that the system of belief 
to which they adhere cannot be proved in any definitive and unequivocal manner.  
Keeping with our emphasis on an agnostic theory of knowledge, as opposed to certitude 
of whatever stripe, this stance is not meant to discredit or privilege any particular 
perspective but rather to equip ourselves with the skills for reflecting at a meta-level on 
why we believe what we believe, in order to facilitate growth, dialogue, and 
understanding over time.  The aim of interventions that align with these goals is to 
discourage any form of religious or non-religious certitude (which appears to lead to 
prejudice and conflict among individuals and groups), while simultaneously fostering a 




regarding transcendental matters (Tan, 2009, 2010).  Practically, our aim would be to 
encourage people to “reflect critically on the committed perspective into which they have 
been nurtured,” with the goal of expanding their ability to take on personally authentic 
convictions (Thiessen, 1993, p. 255).  For example, adapting suggestions by McLaughlin 
(1984, p. 81), an educator, leader, clinician, or parent might consider fostering an 
environment which supports the following processes and attitudes: 
 encourage people to ask questions, and also be willing to respond to questions 
honestly and in a way that respects each person‟s cognitive and emotional 
development; 
 help people reflect on what parts of their perspectives are a matter of faith rather 
than universally agreed upon absolutes; 
 encourage attitudes of empathic patience and understanding in relation to 
religious and non-religious disagreement; 
 propose that morality is not exclusively dependent upon religious belief; 
 be cognizant of the affective, emotional, and dispositional aspects related to the 
development of conviction in tandem with the cognitive aspects of that 
development;  
 respect each individual‟s experience by encouraging the pursuit of their 
developing convictions, while encouraging reflection on any facets which may 
not allow space for respecting the convictions of others. 
 Interventions that seek to foster this type of environment generally benefit from 
utilizing a dialogical approach that aims to balance both openness and rootedness (Tan, 




Appreciation for Multiculturalism” program, which has been implemented at the 
Muhammidyah University of Surakarta, Indonesia (Tan, 2011).  This initiative aims to 
“develop arguments for multicultural Islam based on theological, philosophical and 
Islamic jurisprudential precepts, using these to legitimate the concept of multicultural 
Islam, and to promote religious tolerance towards the multicultural society” (Baidhawy, 
2007, pp. 22-23).  Especially noteworthy, this program is grounded in Islamic teachings 
that are held firmly by many Muslims.  These beliefs include tawhid (the unity of the 
Godhead), which emphasizes the need to maintain the unity of humankind as brothers 
and sisters based on God as the primary source of all humankind; ummah (living 
together), which teaches that all human beings regardless of religion may co-exist 
peacefully; and rahmah (love), which refers to a spirit of love and care in human 
interaction based on the attributes of “God the Merciful and the Benevolent.”  Typically, 
programs such as these have been advanced within and across communities of religious 
believers.  However, we see every reason for those who adhere to an atheistic worldview 
to participate as full and equal partners in similar sorts of cross-conviction dialogues, 
which might be divided into three overlapping and mutually reinforcing levels – 
preliminary dialogue, practical dialogue, and critical dialogue – which we describe next.  
First, preliminary dialogue refers to basic inter-religious engagement through 
symbolic acts of interest and support towards another religion.  Examples include visiting 
a place of worship of another faith, or attending an exhibition showcasing religious 
artifacts from different faiths.  Here, any encounter with believers of another faith is 
spontaneous and sporadic.  This first step does not require direct interaction among 




building bridges or affecting worldviews.  To include atheists within such a paradigm, we 
might suggest that religiously convicted people of whatever faith consider attending 
various atheistic venues, such as “freethinkers” (see www.nobeliefs.com/) or an 
“American Atheists” (see www.atheists.org/) event.  Likewise, atheists might consider 
respectful engagement with peoples who profess religious leanings within their various 
venues.    
Second, practical dialogue focuses on cooperation among adherents of different 
belief traditions with projects that may not be explicitly religious in nature.  The 
objective, as Leganger-Krogstad (2003) maintains, is to make common celebrations and 
ethical practice possible, understandable, and transparent, thereby motivating participants 
to discover common values and essential differences, which make harmonious living 
possible.  One goal of such dialogue is to decide upon a project that reflects such shared 
values, and then, collaborate together in taking action (e.g., working with a local food 
bank; participating in a Habitat for Humanity building project).  This approach 
emphasizes that common values (e.g., harmonious living) are core not only to various 
religious creeds, but are shared also by atheist believers, as exemplified by the “secular 
humanism” movement, which aspires to be a transcending framework for all these 
perspectives (e.g., www.secularhumanism.org/).   
Another example of this type of approach is advocated by an Islamic research 
center in Britain which explicates how a “civic morality” may be established between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, based upon shared principles.  In practice, this means 
articulating a kind of civic morality that identifies how to treat others well, including the 




others.  This approach suggests that Muslims should treat non-Muslim individuals as 
equal in the domain of social interaction, regardless of religious or doctrinal 
disagreements. The starting point for building this framework, from the Islamic point of 
view, is the body of principles outlined in the Qur‟an and Islamic traditions, including 
good neighborliness, charity, hospitality, non-aggression, honoring of commitments, and 
doing good (HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies, 2009, p. 12).  
Such a framework is transitional between practical and critical approaches to dialogue, 
since the latter perspective respects and values commonalities (as the above center 
constructively aspires), but ultimately focuses deliberately upon the specifics of a 
religious tradition.   
Third, critical dialogue involves deliberately planned encounters in which 
participants discuss religious issues based on theological similarities and differences.  
This form of cross-conviction dialogue represents the deepest type of encounter among 
believers of various stripes, as it challenges participants to delve intensively not only into 
the content of their respective creeds, but also to explicate fundamental issues of meaning 
and purpose that are associated with them (i.e., why one believes what one believes).  As 
this form of dialogue represents the “holy grail” (pun intended) of this approach, we 
explicate it in some detail below.  As noted under practical dialogue above, the 
commonalities we share – across the scope of religious and non-religious communities – 
are values that are integral to, but also transcend any particular religion, such as love, 
truth, respect for human dignity, and good works.  Therefore, as previously suggested, it 
seems that one need not abandon strong religious or nonreligious commitments to avoid 




  One common approach for engaging in critical dialogue is found in “inter-faith 
dialogues,” which are based upon the common understanding that there exists a variety of 
moral traditions and legitimate moral differences (Runnymede, 2000).  In concert with 
this theme, the overarching goal of these dialogues is to underline ambiguous and/or 
controversial aspects of a given belief tradition in order to develop religious literacy, 
interfaith relations, greater self-awareness, and active citizenship (Erricker, 2006; 
Ipgrave, 2003).  Without a direct consideration of the underlying assumptions of various 
belief traditions – as well as their related commitments, suspicions, and grievances 
towards other religious and nonreligious traditions – interfaith dialogue exercises remain 
superficial.  Although universal agreement may be reached (e.g., as described under 
practical dialogue above), deeper encounters regarding ethical, metaphysical, 
anthropological or theological content likely will remain elusive without an in-depth 
examination of the most basic convictions of believers across the spectrum (Lindholm, 
2004, as cited in Van Doorn-Harder, 2007). 
For critical dialogue to be successful, we suggest that religious/non-religious 
believers seek to set aside any form of certitude that may hinder inter-religious (and 
nonreligious) understanding.  Guided by an attitude of quest (perhaps fostered by the 
relational connections created via the preliminary and practical dialogues as described 
above), participants may be capable of coming together to explore alternative 
perspectives and interpretations for contested issues in and between various faiths 
(religious and non-religious).  Examples include, but are by no means limited to, 
competing claims or beliefs regarding reason, knowing, truth, contemplation, meaning, 




God, salvation, religious conversion, and the need – or lack thereof – of a religious 
sensibility to live and promote a life worth living for self, others, and the larger world.  
The objective in these dialogues is not to win the argument or even to reach a consensus 
(although this endpoint is desirable, if possible and legitimate), but to understand and to 
learn. Furthermore, the discussion should take place within a framework of all parties 
stating and justifying their views rationally while respecting the rights of others to hold to 
their views and agree to disagree as necessary.  
  In preparing participants to reflect critically on another belief system in a 
productive manner, it is helpful first to foster a degree of understanding and empathy 
with that system, which may attenuate critical comments that are based upon false 
stereotypes or prejudices.  While it may be salutary for participants to question and even 
challenge the assumptions of certain religious beliefs and practices, discussants should 
avoid inflammatory statements or postures in general.  In short, participants need to know 
that freedom of speech requires responsibility and accountability, and should be provided 
with guidelines regarding how, whom, and what to question in a socially acceptable and 
constructive manner, while also avoiding “political correctness” (e.g., hypersensitivity; 
affective flatness; denial of difference; an “everyone is right” sentiment), since such 
processes ultimately undermine honesty and depth, tend to be superficial and conflict 
avoidant, and are unlikely in any case to achieve substantive outcomes at an individual or 
group level.  One specific model that may be useful in this regard is the “intergroup 
dialogue” methodology, which thoughtfully and strategically brings together equal 
numbers of “opposing” perspectives and/or representatives of “different” facets of an 




perspectives articulated earlier in this dissertation (e.g., the difference between 
fundamentalism and orthodoxy; what the “quest” perspective implies; the meaning and 
implications of the “Continuum of Belief”) also may provide the terminological 
heuristics and conceptual scaffolding that are necessary to facilitate such meta-level 
reflection.  Whatever the method or approach, achieving balance between appropriate 
sensitivity and honest conviction is key to achieving both depth and integrity vis-à-vis 
processes of critical dialogue.  Concretely, participants may be encouraged to reflect upon 
the nature of different religious and non-religious beliefs (e.g., the content of the belief 
system), the foundation of such beliefs (e.g., the etiology of such beliefs and why they are 
promulgated), and the perceptions of the adherents to such beliefs regarding their validity 
(e.g., why believers contend that their belief system is good or true).   
  For example, in addition to contemplation regarding the various big picture 
concepts noted above (e.g., meaning, purpose), participants might bore down further by 
comparing the various and competing interpretations of „jihad‟ used by Islamist groups to 
justify terrorist acts, and by others (Muslims and non-Muslims) who condemn such acts.  
An exploration of this concept might help participants obtain a more critical and 
reflective understanding of the varieties of Muslim religious expression.  Alternatively, 
the origins and potential dilemma of the faith-based claim by both Christians and 
Muslims that their leader (Jesus and Mohammed, respectively) is the primary 
representative of God, as opposed to any other such figure in the past, present, or future 
may be a fruitful source of discussion, as can an analogous point of contrast with 
Hinduism (many gods, but perhaps from one source) or Buddhism (in which the Buddha 




devotees).  As a final example, an examination of the fundamental atheist belief that there 
is no god and no need for god – along with an attendant observation regarding how much 
destruction has been done in the name of god – can be a useful point of contrast and 
discussion when facilitated respectfully and constructively.  Again, the point of such 
critical dialogue is not to convince others, although such outcomes may occur, but rather 
to reflect deeply and honestly not only about what one believes and values, but why such 
convictions matter in the first place, as well as how an experience of certitude may 
present a source of comfort and/or conflict for self, others, and the larger world.   
  Reflecting upon the importance of such critical dialogue from an Islamic 
perspective, Noor (2003) urges fellow believers to “re-learn the norms and rules of 
dialogue and communication” (p. 325) in a spirit of intelligence, honesty, and 
compassion: 
Recognizing the multiplicity within ourselves opens the way for us to recognize 
the multiplicity of the other as well.  It would mean that we would be able to look 
at the West (and the rest) for what it truly is: a complex assembly of actors and 
agents, interests, beliefs, values, and ideas that may not be completely in harmony 
with each other.  It may also help us realize that in the midst of that confusing and 
complex heterogeneity that is the other are also values, beliefs, and ideas that are 
common to ours.…We need to remind ourselves continually of the fact that the 
Western world is far from uniform and that there exists a vast array of Western 
thinkers, leaders, activists, and citizens who care for Muslims as much as they do 
for their own.  These are our real allies and friends, and we must never abandon or 




The three types of inter-religious dialogues discussed above may be implemented 
sequentially, progressively, or concurrently, depending on specific needs and objectives.  
In the end, what seems important is to encourage dialogue in all contexts (i.e., not just 
formal but also non-formal and informal), while emphasizing authentic relational 
connections with those who hold differing beliefs and values.  If dialogues such as these 
involve the key stakeholders from all segments of a society – such as schools, religious 
institutions, social groups, and of course the state and its attendant political structures – 
outcomes over the long term may be moving and salutary, if not transformative.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
At the outset of this dissertation, we proposed that the need for a deeper 
understanding of religious faith is of great relevance in our increasingly globalized world, 
as religious systems which seem to contradict one‟s own beliefs and values often are 
perceived as a personal or cultural attack, which may lead to conflict or even violence 
toward the perceived source of this attack.  From this point of departure, we considered 
certitude, a construct defined as the “absence of doubt,” in adherents of religious and 
non-religious beliefs, whether they be the fundamentalist versions of various religious 
faiths or the strident truth claims proposed by some advocates of atheism.  We then noted 
that the tendency toward certitude requires fidelity to an allied epistemological 
framework with its own set of assumptions, before turning to an overview of various 
psychological theories and theorists, who have expressed negative (e.g., Freud, Skinner), 
positive (e.g., Jung, Maslow), and contemporary (e.g., the role of human attachment in 




From there, we examined the complexity of religious certitude in relation to 
prejudice, including the intriguing finding that religious belief in itself may not 
necessarily be associated with antipathy toward “the other,” but rather depends upon how 
beliefs subjectively are held by believers (e.g., the difference between fundamentalist and 
orthodox experiences of religious ideation, with the former group showing higher, and 
the latter group lower, degrees of prejudice overall).  Along these lines, we considered 
the various forms in which religious ideation may be held by its adherent, with a specific 
examination of the broader “quest” orientation, which apprehends religious commitment 
as an ongoing process that is worked out and understood over time, in concert with the 
evolution of one‟s identity (i.e., one may grapple with one‟s religious / spiritual 
perspectives over the course of one‟s life).  Among other aspects related to the etiology of 
certitude, we examined those from neuroscience, which offer tantalizing clues regarding 
the affectively mediated bias that seems tied to a sense of certainty regarding one‟s 
religious or non-religious beliefs.   
At this point, we turned our attention to the overarching model and method that 
represented the investigative core of this dissertation, first by providing a brief overview 
of Equilintegration (EI) Theory and the EI Self, as well as the Beliefs, Events, and Values 
Inventory (BEVI).  Following this overview, we offered a series of data-based findings 
from a multi-institution assessment of learning project, which resulted in five concluding 
points.  First, in exploring certitude generally, and religious certitude in particular, it is 
important to operationalize our definitions carefully.  Second, psychological constructs 
may be more deeply understood by researching the characteristics of who is, and is not, 




generally is tied to a wide range of other belief structures (e.g., regarding other cultures as 
well as the natural world).  Fourth, within-group-differences may be greater than 
between-group-differences when dividing people by religious / non-religious 
identification, which suggests the need to eschew surface level analyses of religious and 
non-religious people both in scholarly and lay discourse.  Fifth, the relative degree of 
religious or non-religious certitude an individual expresses may largely be determined by 
a range of formative variables, but in a complex, interacting, and non-linear manner.  On 
the basis of such findings, and in light of the original goals of this dissertation, we 
suggest that an agnostic stance along the “Continuum of Belief” may represent the most 
intellectually defensible framework regarding matters over which scientifically definitive 
conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – seem 
untenable, while offering an aspirational framework that mitigates against shrill diatribes 
and destructive behaviors toward individuals and groups who “believe” differently.   
Finally, in rounding out our discussion, we attempted to translate this perspective 
into applied form by describing educational and psychological interventions that 
encourage critical and reflective thinking about religious or non-religious systems of 
thought, with a specific focus on cross-conviction dialogues which may be divided into 
three overlapping and mutually reinforcing levels: preliminary, practical, and critical.  By 
providing descriptive information and examples of each of these types of cross-
conviction dialogues,  it is our hope that this dissertation may help advance the 
overarching goal of facilitating greater openness, reflection, and understanding among the 




  In the final analysis, what is recommended most is the cultivation of a culture of 
humble curiosity and respectful exploration in which individuals may interact with those 
who hold a different religious or non-religious perspective in an honest, authentic, 
inquiring, and intellectually responsible manner.  Perhaps, if we strive to nurture psyches 
that are less inclined toward certitude, human beings will be freer to exercise religious 
faith or non-religious faith on the basis of a richly earned awareness of why one does or 
does not believe as one does.  By bravely accepting that definitive claims seem untenable 
– particularly regarding matters that appear to transcend the bounds of empirical 
reasoning – we may best be prepared for open engagement with self, others, and the 
larger world.  Hopefully, such a caring, candid, and committed stance may help us to 
navigate more authentically the mysteries that are integral to our lived experience 
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Erricker, C. (2006). If you don‟t know the difference you are living with, how can you  
learn to live with it? Taking difference seriously in spiritual and religious  
education. International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, 11 (1), 137-150. 
  
This article argues that the current approach to religious education in England, 
which emphasizes religious pluralism and “moral homogeneity,” is inadequate in 
addressing the growing challenge of religious extremism.  The author argues 
instead for an approach which grants that world religions have distinct 




inquiring into the key concepts of their worldview, and understanding how these 
concepts motivate and affect the behavior of believers.  It is hoped that by 
engaging with different beliefs, that students will be better able to establish their 
own beliefs, convictions, and ethics.   
 
Eunike, J. (2009). The influence of religious fundamentalism, right-wing  
authoritarianism, and Christian orthodoxy on explicit and implicit measures of  
attitudes towards homosexuals. International Journal for the Psychology of  
Religion, 18 (4), 316-329. 
 
This study looked at the relationship between various types of religious belief 
(religious fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, and Christian orthodoxy) 
and one‟s implicit and explicit attitudes towards homosexuals.  In regards to 
explicit attitudes, religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism each 
predicted negative attitudes towards homosexuals.  Right-wing authoritarianism 
was also a significant predictor of implicit negative attitudes towards 
homosexuals.  However, Christian orthodoxy (belief in basic tenants of the 
Christian faith), was related to positive explicit attitudes towards homosexual 
people.  This study suggests the central role of right-wing authoritarianism in 
religiously-based bias against homosexuals, as well as the potential value of 






Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Kastenmüller, A., Jonas, E., & Frey, D. (2006).  Coping with 
terrorism: The impact of increased salience of terrorism on mood and self-efficacy 
of intrinsically religious and nonreligious people. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 32, 365-377. 
 
 This study hypothesized that intrinsic religious belief would help people to cope 
with terrorism, and explored this possibility by looking at self-efficacy and mood in 
believers and nonbelievers after a terrorist attack.  The authors‟ sample suggested 
that intrinsic religiosity was correlated with higher levels of self-efficacy and 
positive emotions on the day of terrorist attacks.  However, when an attack had not 
recently occurred there was no difference in mood or efficacy found when 
comparing intrinsic believers with nonbelievers.  This article also provided a helpful 
overview of the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as well as the 
literature linking extrinsic religiosity with negative or maladaptive coping.   
 
Flere, S., Edwards, K. J., & Klanjsek, R. (2008). Religious orientation in three central  
European environments: quest, intrinsic, and extrinsic dimensions. International 
Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 18, 1-21. 
 
This study investigated the validity of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity 
constructs across three diverse cultural samples (Bosnian Muslim, Serbian 
Orthodox, and Slovenian Catholic).  Interestingly, the construct of a questing 




Muslim sample than it was in the two Christian samples suggesting the cultural 
dependence of this construct, favoring more pluralistic and postmodern contexts.  
Specifically, it seems that in cultures where there is less tolerance for “religious 
switching,” a questing orientation is negatively associated with an intrinsic 
orientation, inferring that questing attitudes may be culturally inadmissible.  
Finally, this article provided some preliminary evidence suggesting that the 
extrinsic religiosity construct might be subdivided into a two separate components 
(a religious one and a psychological one). 
 
Ford, T. E., Brignall, T., VanValey, T. L., & Makalu‟s, M. J. (2009). The unmaking of  
prejudice: How Christian beliefs relate to attitudes toward homosexuals. Journal 
 for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48 (1), 146-160. 
 
Through two studies Ford and colleagues investigated the hypothesis that 
orthodox Christian beliefs discourage feelings of prejudice against others, and 
lead to self-critical emotions when one acts in a prejudicial manner.  The first 
study provided evidence that orthodox Christian beliefs are correlated with a 
desire to act without prejudice towards homosexual people as well as African-
Americans when controlling for the effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and 
political conservatism.  In addition, the second study‟s results suggested that 
Christian orthodoxy is not related to attitudes towards homosexual practices.  
These studies support the contention that it is the merging of socially conservative 




relationship between religion and prejudice.  In fact, these findings suggest that 
orthodox Christian beliefs might actually protect against prejudice attitudes and 
behaviors in believers. 
 
Frame, J. M. (1987). The doctrine of the knowledge of god.  Phillipsburg, NJ:  
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. 
 
This is a book by a Christian presuppositional theologian, who argues that one can 
start from the assumption that the Christian Bible is true, and thus build certain 
knowledge from that basis.  Since the God described in the Christian Bible is the 
ultimate source of truth (according to the author), a believer who has a 
relationship with this God can have certainty.  That is, if one receives knowledge 
from the source of truth, then they can be certain of that knowledge. 
 
Freud, S. (1961). The future of an illusion (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton  
& Company. 
 
In this classic work, Freud argues that religion is an illusion based in one‟s unmet 
childhood needs for protection and love from one‟s father.  According to Freud, 
by believing in an all-powerful and benevolent father (god), one is able to address 
one‟s underlying fears regarding life.  He continues by describing religious belief 
in the terms of a universal neurosis or psychiatric delusion, which is essentially in 




and religion, and ultimately concludes that just because science may not be 
capable of providing us with a transcendent meaning, that does not mean that we 
should look for it in the delusion of religion. 
 
Fromm, E. (1950). Psychoanalysis and religion. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
 In this book, Fromm argues that it is more helpful to understand the ways in  
which humans believe, rather than to focus on the content of their faith 
perspectives.  He frames this approach by separating religious belief into 
“humanistic” and “authoritarian” subtypes.  He also expands the definition of 
religion to include atheism, arguing that religion is any framework that helps 
humans to make meaning in light of their experiences of existential anxiety.  
Finally, he argues that psychology is not a threat to religion, and that instead 
psychologists should see religion (in its “humanistic” form) as beneficial to 
human well-being. 
 
Gorsuch, R. L., & Aleshire, D. (1974). Christian faith and ethnic prejudice: A review and  
interpretation of research. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 13 (3), 281-
307. 
 
This literature review concluded that the average church member is more 
ethnically prejudiced than the average attending non-member (because he/she is 




in the church were found to be as non-prejudicial as attending non-members.  
Thus, the authors concluded that the holding of a strong value position, that 
removes one from the society at large, is advantageous in the adoption of a non-
prejudicial perspective.  Further, the review noted that the more intrinsically 
religious, nonfundamentalistic, and theologically discriminating a person is, the 
less prejudiced they tend to be. 
 
Granqvist, P. (2007). Examining relations among attachment, religiosity, and new age  
spirituality using the adult attachment interview. Developmental Psychopathology, 
43 (3), 590-601. 
 
In addition to the study itself, this article provided a nice review of the literature 
on the relationship between religiosity and attachment theory.  For instance, 
religious people may seek closeness to God in prayer and rituals, use God as a 
safe haven during distress, as well as use God as a secure base for exploring the 
environment.  Some have even theorized that individuals with secure attachments 
tend to form relationships with a loving and caring God, while individuals with 
insecure attachments are more likely to perceive God as distant or not form a 
relationship with God at all.  This study looked at adult attachment styles and 
compared them with various forms of religious phenomenon.  The results suggest 
that experiences with insensitive parents (e.g., rejecting and/or role-reversing) 
may be associated with sudden religious changes (such as conversions) during life 




associated with the holding of “New Age” beliefs (e.g., personal contact with the 
dead, spiritual possession, nontheistic/paranormal experiences). 
 
Haidt, J. (2007, September 22). Moral psychology and the misunderstanding of religion. 
Retrieved from http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt07/haidt07_index.html 
 
This article outlines the scientific discoveries that have contributed to our modern 
understanding that emotional processes are more predictive of behavior than our 
conscious thoughts or beliefs.  Haidt‟s theory regarding the five foundations of 
morality is also reviewed, which suggests that self-identified liberals value only 
fairness/reciprocity (a‟ la Lawrence Kohlburg) and harm/care for others (a‟ la 
Carol Gilligan), while self-identified conservatives also value the moral principles 
of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.  He then goes on to 
explain how this may provide some insight into religious belief, and points out the 
similarities between the statements of some atheists and fundamentalist believers 











Harford, T. (2011, April 23). Why we‟re all far too sure of ourselves. The Financial  
Times. Retrieved from  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9219969e-6a28-11e0-86e4-00144feab49a.html 
 
This article highlights the pervasive attractiveness of certainty from an economic 
and political perspective, as well as the presence of the assumptions which 
underlie certainty of any type.  The author continues by pointing out the power of 
certainty to attract followers, and the dangers of being certain at the cost of 
neglecting evidence and reasonable doubt. 
 
Himmelfarb, G. (2012, September 29). The once-born and twice-born. The Wall Street  
Journal, p. C5. 
 
Himmelfarb draws a parallel between the arguments of modern atheists (such as 
Richard Dawkins) and the challenges to belief that William James addressed 
during his time at Harvard in the late 19th century.  By unpacking some of 
William James‟s perspectives regarding the different types of belief, the author 
points out that the “terrible simplifiers” (the certain) tend to dominate discourse 
all too often, polarizing issues in topics as diverse as philosophy, politics, 







Hogg, M. A. (2005). Uncertainty, social identity, and ideology. In S. R. Thye & E. J.  
Lawler (Eds.), Social identification in groups (Vol. 22). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 
 
The chapter integrates a number of studies to make the argument that a person‟s 
level of self-uncertainty is related to a desire to identify with groups that are able 
to provide a sense of security by requiring significant ideological commitment for 
membership.  According to the author, these groups allow someone to 
“depersonalize” and feel secure in a clearly delineated category defined by the 
group‟s identity.  Further, group members are arguably motivated to ensure that 
evaluations of the group are positive (in order to maintain their positive sense of 
self-esteem) and are often also motivated to ensure that their group is seen as 
better than other competing groups.     
 
Hogg, M. A. (2011). Self-uncertainty, social identity, and the solace of extremism.  In M. 
A. Hogg & D. L. Blaylock (Eds.), Extremism and the psychology of uncertainty 
(pp. 19-35). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Hogg, M. A., Adelman, J. R., & Blagg, R. D. (2010). Religion in the face of uncertainty: 
An uncertainty-identity theory account of religiousness. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 14, 72-83. 
 
 This article makes the argument that religions have unique characteristics that 




instance, religions provide answers for the most basic questions of human 
existence, such as one‟s purpose.  They also utilize rituals and ceremonies, and 
provide moral guidelines that give someone a course for purposeful living.  These 
characteristics of religions are particularly powerful in their ability to provide a 
sense of security, according to the authors, when they are absolutistic.   
 
HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies (2009). Contextualising Islam 
in Britain: exploratory perspectives. A project by the University of Cambridge in 
association with the Universities of Exeter and Westminster. Cambridge: Centre 
of Islamic Studies. 
 
 This white paper, developed primarily by the Centre for Islamic Studies at 
Cambridge University, reviews the characteristics of Islam as it is expressed in 
Britain as well as the political and socio-economic factors which lead to its 
acceptance or exclusion.  The report also reflects on the interaction between 
Islamic theologies and the pluralist secular zeitgeist which currently pervades the 
country.  The authors ultimately argue that there is great overlap between Islamic 
beliefs and the “secular” values of equality, respect for the rights of others, and 
the rejection of discrimination.  For this reason, they feel that Muslims can thrive 







Hunsberger, B. (1989). A short version of the Christian orthodoxy scale. Journal for the  
Scientific Study of Religion, 28 (3), 360-365. 
 
This article introduces a short version of the Christian Orthodoxy scale, and 
describes the strengths and weaknesses of using the short versus the long version.  
It also provides a review of the psychometrics of the original Christian Orthodoxy 
scale, as well as its relationship with other constructs (such as Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism). 
 
Hunsberger, B. (1995). Religion and prejudice: The role of religious fundamentalism,  
quest, and right-wing authoritarianism. Journal of Social Issues, 51 (2), 113-129. 
 
This work highlights how the findings on religion‟s relationship with prejudice 
are positive, negative, and even curvilinear (in light of the validity challenges to 
some of Allport‟s measures of religiosity).  Newer conceptualizations of religious 
orientation such as quest and religious fundamentalism focus more on the ways 
religious beliefs are held rather than the content of the beliefs.  The authors see 
the quest orientation as effectively being the opposite of religious 
fundamentalism.  They also highlight how confronting fundamentalist believers 
with the consequences of their orientation may lower their prejudice.  Finally, the 
authors call for additional work focused on investigating the complex relationship 





Hunsberger, B., & Jackson, L. M. (2005).Religion, meaning, and prejudice. Journal of  
Social Issues, 61 (4), 807-826. 
 
This article provides a helpful summary of intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, and religious 
fundamentalist orientations as well as some of the ways that religiosity has been 
related to violence and conflict.  Further, the idea of high versus low religious 
fundamentalism is described, as well as each type of fundamentalism‟s possible 
correlations to more or less complex thought processes.  Social Identity Theory is 
also reviewed, along with its claims that people maintain and enhance self-esteem 
through downward comparisons with other groups.  Finally, the article suggests 
that even though a person may not approve of a certain behavior (such as 
homosexual sex), he or she may still express positive feelings towards its 
participants (homosexual people). 
 
Ipgrave, J. (2003). Dialogue, citizenship, and religious education. In R. Jackson (Ed.),  
International perspectives on citizenship, education and religious diversity (pp.  
147-168). London: Routledge Falmer. 
 
Jackson, L. M., & Hunsberger, B. (1999). An intergroup perspective on religion and  
prejudice. Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 38 (4), 509-523. 
 
Through empirical examinations of prejudicial attitudes towards religious and 




religious groups tend to promote prejudice towards out-groups.   Most 
interestingly, the results of these studies could be interpreted to infer that those 
who are more religious (i.e. more certain of their belief system) tend to be 
prejudiced towards people of different religious orientations regardless of the 
content of their doctrine (e.g. religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, 
intrinsic, extrinsic).  Even among atheists, the authors found prejudice towards 
“believers.”  The authors conclude that the dynamics between religious groups 
parallel those found in other intergroup relations, where one‟s fusion with the 
group enhances self-esteem, thus leading to antagonism towards out-groups which 
are a threat to one‟s bolstered sense of security. 
 
James, W. (1902).The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature.  
Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press. 
 
In this seminal work, William James explores religion and spirituality from a 
variety of different perspectives based on his experiences with various religions 
expressions.  He also discusses his theory of “healthy-minded” religion, 
contrasting it with dogmatism.  Ultimately, he concludes with the hypothesis that 
a higher power communicates through the human‟s subconscious self, and thus 
makes an impact on physical reality through humans.  He argues that belief in a 
supernatural reality, beyond the reach of physics or biology, respects the human 
experience in a way that purely empirical scientific perspective (to the exclusion 




Jung, C. G. (1933). Modern man in search of his soul. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc. 
 
In this classic work, Jung describes his theory of archetypes which he argues exist 
in the human unconscious, and can be seen reflected in religious and spiritual 
beliefs.  He describes religious/spiritual belief as a search for meaning, and sees 
modern man as searching for a new perspective to fill the space left by the decline 
of traditional institutionalized religion.  His argument is that people need to find a 
new source of meaning to help them make sense of life, and that this loss of 
meaning is at the core of many psychological problems.   
 
Keller, T. (2008). The reason for god: Belief in an age of skepticism. New York: Dutton.  
 
This book, written by a Manhattan preacher soon after the release of Richard 
Dawkin‟s God Delusion, attempts to present an accessible argument for the 
reasonableness of the historical Christian faith.  It also responds to some of the 
claims of Dawkin‟s and other outspoken Atheists directly, and seeks to address 
some of the common concerns people often have regarding Christian doctrine and 









Kiesling, C. (2008). Identity and spirituality: A psychosocial exploration of the sense of  
spiritual self. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, (1), 50-62. 
 
This study analyzed interviews with 28 “devout believers,” qualitatively assessing 
the content from the interviews and rating each person‟s level of spiritual role 
salience as well as the flexibility of their beliefs.  Inspired by Erikson‟s theory of 
human development (with his claim that healthy adults nurture their spiritual 
tendencies) and Marcia‟s views on identity development, the author suggests 
several different categories of spiritual belief: foreclosed, moratorium, and 
achieved.  While the first stage is characterized by a lack of exposure to other 
ways of believing and a general adoption of beliefs present in one‟s family or 
environment, the later stages are characterized by exploring other belief options 
and making individualized belief commitments through a process of personal 
reflection. 
 
Kirkpatrick, L. A. & Shaver P. R. (1990). Attachment theory and religion: Childhood  
attachments, religious beliefs, and conversion. Journal for the Scientific Study of  
Religion, 29 (3), 315-334. 
 
This study explored the impact of childhood attachment on one‟s religious beliefs 
in adulthood.  The findings suggested that those with avoidant attachment styles 
were most likely (compared to those with more secure attachments) to be 




new religion suddenly.  Based on these findings, the authors concluded that 
religion might provide a substitute attachment figure (e.g. God) that would be 
particularly attractive to those whose attachment needs were not met adequately 
as children. 
 
Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1993). Fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, and intrinsic religious  
orientation as predictors of discriminatory attitudes. Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion, 32 (3), 256-268. 
 
When the effects of intrinsic religion were controlled for, this study showed that 
fundamentalism was positively correlated with 5 different scales of prejudice, 
while Christian Orthodoxy was either negatively or neutrally correlated with all 5 
scales.  Christian Orthodoxy was also only moderately correlated with 
fundamentalism in this study, further indicating the differentiation of these two 
constructs. 
 
Laythe, B., Finkel, D.G., Bringle, R.G., & Kirkpatrick, L.A. (2002). Religious  
fundamentalism as a predictor of prejudice: A two-component model. Journal for  
the Scientific Study of Religion, 41 (4), 623-635. 
 
Laythe, B., Finkel, D., & Kirkpatrick, L.A. (2001). Predicting prejudice from religious  
fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism: A multiple-regression approach.  




Leganger-Krogstad, H. (2003). Dialogue among young citizens in pluralistic religious  
education classroom. In Jackson, R. (Ed.), International Perspectives on 
Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (pp. 169-190). London: 
RoutledgeFalmer. 
 
This chapter describes the Norwegian public education system‟s current approach 
to religious education, a country which historically divided children into different 
classrooms based on religious beliefs.  In contrast, the current approach seeks to 
integrate children from different religious perspectives by having them participate 
in activities that require them to work together and build relationships and 
understanding.  Though religious dialogue is not the goal of these activities, it is 
often a natural consequence as the children grow to understand other beliefs by 
building close working relationships with those who hold them.  Further, as the 
children work together, they are in a prime position to observe the similar values 
that their diverse belief systems share in common. 
 
Leuba, J. H. (1925). The psychology of religious mysticism. New York: Harcourt, Brace  
and Company. 
 
In this work, Leuba describes several religious expressions but focuses primarily 
on Christianity, highlighting that drugs provide a similar effect as religious 
experiences in their ability to enlarge one‟s perspective and alter their emotions.  




along with other experiments seeking to experimentally understand intrapersonal 
religious phenomenon.  He concludes with the idea that science is able to provide 
the mystical experiences that many have found in religion, and uses 
psychotherapy as an example of the ways that secular practices can meet these 
human “needs.” 
 
Leuba, J. H. (1950). The reformation of the churches. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
This work provides an outline of Leuba‟s views on religion, particularly religions  
that believe God interacts directly with humans.  Leuba also describes the reasons 
for his belief that the inspiration, meaning, and moral guidance provided by 
religion can be accessed through a reformed, secular version of “church.”  Finally, 
he provides a framework for the basic beliefs or doctrines that this type of church 
might hold, as well as the ways in which they might bring healing to those who 
are struggling with psychological difficulties.    
 
Lindholm, T. (2004).Philosophical and religious justifications of freedom of religion or  
belief. In T. Lindholm, Jr., W.C. Durham, & B.G. Tahzib-Lie (Eds.), Facilitating 
freedom of religion or belief: a deskbook (pp. 19-62). The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
 
 This chapter seeks to provide an argument for why it is important to give people 




and political contexts which do not value this right.  Further, it explores the 
challenges that arise in an environment that seeks to honor religious diversity in 
this way (e.g. what to do when the beliefs of one person conflict with or infringe 
on the rights of another).  This discussion is highly relevant to the topic of 
religious dialogue, and it points out the importance of not overlooking specific 
religious claims and doctrines as these are often a source of conflict even when 
shared values between religions have been identified.    
 
Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 551-558. 
 
In this classic article, Marcia describes four different developmental pathways that 
he argues adolescents may take as they seek to develop their ego identity in 
relation to occupation and ideology: identity achievement, moratorium, 
foreclosure, or identity diffusion.  One unique aspect of this study, in comparison 
to some developmental theories that rely only on qualitative interviews, is that it 
integrates objective process tasks and self-report measures.  This work was 
expanded upon by Kiesling, with a particular emphasis on the way in which one 








Maslow, A. H. (1964). Religions, values, and peak-experiences. Columbus, OH: Ohio  
State University Press. 
 
In this work, Maslow details the unfortunate historical split between science and 
religion.  He argues that while their relationship is often misunderstood, many of 
the needs, yearnings, quests, and other components of religion can be studied 
empirically through science.  He then goes on to point out what he believes to be 
unique about the religious beliefs of those who have had a peak experience 
(where they felt privately and intimately connected to a spiritual reality that 
convinced them of values such as truth, justice, and beauty).  Those who have had 
this experience are then contrasted with those who, instead of having a peak 
experience for themselves, have instead used organized or conventional religion 
in such a way as to defend against or suppress their opportunity to have a peak 
experience of their own.  They do this, Maslow argues, by following the traditions 
and dogmas of their religion, which are tied to the peak experience of a figure in 
the past.   
 
May, R. (1983).The discovery of being. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
This work outlines May‟s existential approach to psychology, as well as the 
philosophical perspectives that form its foundation.  For instance, he describes 
Kierkegaard‟s arguments regarding the relational nature of truth, which highlight 




nature of certainty claims).  While May sees the value of other approaches to 
psychotherapy (e.g. behaviorism, psychodynamic therapy) he ultimately argues 
that we cannot break a person up into their respective behaviors without missing 
their true essence or “being,” which is greater than the sum of its parts.   
 
McFarland, S. G. (1989). Religious Orientations and the Targets of Discrimination. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 28 (3), 324-336.  
 
This study found that religious fundamentalism was correlated with a general 
tendency towards discrimination, with specific discrimination towards women, 
homosexuals, and communists.  Further, when the impact of fundamentalism was 
controlled for in those who were intrinsically religious, the discriminatory 
tendencies originally found in this group disappeared.  Finally, a questing 
religious orientation was negatively correlated with all forms of discriminatory 
attitudes measured.  This study highlights the importance of differentiating the 
content of one‟s beliefs from the particular way in which one holds those beliefs 
when seeking to understand religion‟s relationship with discrimination. 
 
McLaughlin, T. H. (1984). Parental rights and the religious upbringing of children. 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 18, 75–83. 
 
 McLaughlin discusses the challenge of respecting parent‟s rights to raise their 




societies which value pluralism, tolerance, and individual autonomy.  The author 
then reviews some of the common arguments against allowing parents to 
“indoctrinate” their children, while also providing a counterargument and 
framework for how parents can provide religious education to their children in a 
way that respects their autonomy as well as the realities and needs of a pluralistic 
society. 
 
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2001). Attachment theory and intergroup bias: Evidence  
that priming the secure base schema attenuates negative reactions to out-groups.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 97-115. 
 
This article describes a series of studies which examined the effect that priming 
may have in activating a person‟s underlying attachment schema.  The results of 
their five studies suggested that priming a person‟s sense of secure attachment 
(even if their primary attachment style was not secure) removed any out-group 
bias that may have been present otherwise.  The authors hypothesize that the 
priming of a sense of security activates a secure attachment schema because, 
regardless of one‟s background, a person may be able to (at least subconsciously) 
recall some instance when they felt secure.  However, the authors also found that 
when secure attachment priming procedures were not used, a person‟s baseline 
level of attachment anxiety was related to their level of negative reactions towards 





Murphy, C. (2012, February 12). The certainty of doubt. The New York Times, p. SR12. 
 
This New York Times editorial briefly reviews the effects of moral and/or 
ideological certainty in history (e.g. inquisitions, fascism, terrorism) and the 
temptation for society to seek to combat absolutism by responding in kind, or by 
limiting liberty or democratic rights.  The article resolves with a call to resist the 
temptation to seek to control absolutism through authoritarianism, arguing instead 
for the subversive power of doubt. 
 
Nagel, T. (1997). The last word. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
In this modern philosophy classic, Nagel argues for the value of objective reason 
and points out the assumptions that often underlie strong subjectivity and 
relativism.  He sees reason as a universal truth, and an essential building block for 
effective communication and the addressing of societal challenges.  In order to 
make his argument, he points out what he sees as the underlying assumptions of 
competing claims, whether they be in the fields of ethics, science, or language. 
 
Noor, F. A. (2003). What is the victory of Islam? Towards a different understanding of 
the ummah and political success in the contemporary world. In O. Safi (Ed.), 






Paloutzian, R. F., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1995). Introduction: The scope of religious  
influences on personal and societal well-being. Journal of Social Issues, 51 (2), 1-
11. 
 
This article provides an overview of the psychological literature on religion and 
human well-being defined broadly, including social challenges such as prejudice.  
The authors are sensitive to the multiple constructs used to understand religion, as 
well as the complex relationships that these constructs have with outcomes.  
Further, they call for additional research focused on better understanding these 
dynamics by integrating different branches of thought, rejecting any claims that 
the question of religion‟s effect on human well-being has been answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
Pargament, K. I., & Park, C. L. (1995). Merely a defense?  The variety of religious means  
and ends. Journal of Social Issues, 51 (2), 13-32. 
 
According to this article, the assumption in much psychological literature is that 
religious belief serves as a defense against reality.  This paper seeks to explore 
and challenge this view by reviewing relevant research regarding religion‟s 
relationship with psychological variables (e.g. anxiety, depression, self-
actualization).  It provides a helpful overview of the various psychological 
conceptualizations of religion that have been proposed, including some lesser 




“control by God.”  The lack of secure attachment is also highlighted as a likely 
indicator of seeing God as authoritarian and feeling “threatened” if one‟s religious 
world view is questioned.  Finally, the authors discuss some interesting 
perspectives regarding the relationship between authoritarian governments and 
Christian missionaries, as well as the relationship between religious orientation 
and militancy.  They conclude with a call for future research on the factors which 
determine the shape of someone‟s religious orientation, suggesting the value of 
collaboration between religious and academic circles.   
 
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
This philosophical treatise discusses the nature of knowledge and the importance 
of context as well as the individual thinker in understanding one‟s resultant beliefs 
and justifications.  Plantinga addresses competing ideas regarding knowledge 
(such as those put forth by Descartes, Locke, John Pollock, and those grounded in 
Bayesian thought), making arguments for why they may or may not be valid in 
turn.  Ultimately, Plantinga argues that a supernatural metaphysics is an essential 
foundation for a sound epistemology, and that metaphysical naturalism is 








Rohner, R. P. (1986). The warmth dimension: Foundations of parental acceptance- 
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